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ABSTRACT 
 
The reduction of protections in the event of an unlawful dismissal, made by the 
c.d. The Job Act issued in 2014-2015 by the Italian Parliament and Government, 
with a particular focus to workers hired after March 7, 2015, was the subject of an 
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order submitted by the Labor Court of Rome to the Italian Constitutional Court, 
on suspicion of unconstitutionality. The legal construction used by the Judge 
highlights the violation of Article 24 ESC as an <<interposed (standard)rule>>. It 
is the first time that an Italian Labor Court has raised this issue so clearly. The 
comment aims to identify the different plans of protection measures in this kind of 
hypothesis. 
 
KEY WORDS: Dismissal, labour market reform, Italy, European Social Charter 
(ESC), interposed standard rule, unconstitutionality, European Committee of 
Social Rights (ECSR). 
 
RESUME 
 
La réduction des protections en cas de licenciement illégal, faite par le c.d. Job 
Act promulguée en 2014-2015 par le Parlement et le Gouvernement italiens, en 
particulier les travailleurs embauchés après le 7 mars 2015, a fait l'objet d'une 
ordonnance du Tribunal du Travail de Rome devant la Cour constitutionnelle 
italienne, soupçonnée de inconstitutionnalité. L'interprétation juridique utilisée par 
le juge met en évidence la violation de l'article 24 CSE en tant que «règle 
interposée (standard)». C'est la première fois qu'un Tribunal du Travail italien 
soulève cette question si clairement. Le commentaire vise à identifier les 
différents plans de mesures de protection dans ce type d'hypothèse. 
  
MOTS-CLES: Licenciement, réforme du marché du travail, Italie, Charte Sociale 
Européenne (CES), règle standard interposée, droit international, 
inconstitutionnalité, Comité européen des Droits sociaux (CEDS). 
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1.Introduction to the question case 
 
The decision - reported in the full text - is of considerable interest by virtue of the logic 
followed by the remitting Judge. 
The Labour Court Judge of Rome (Tribunale di Roma – Sezione Lavoro – Judge: Maria 
Giulia Cosentino) raised an interlocutory procedure for the review of constitutionality : 
of art. 1, paragraph 7, letter c), of Law no. 183/2014 and of the articles 2, 4 and 10 of 
Legislative Decree no. 23/2015 (Editor’s note: the combination of the two rules is for 
simplicity defined by the Judge with the expression "Jobs Act"); in the opinion of the 
Roman Judge << the normative innovation deprives today's appellant of most of the 
protections still in force for those who have been hired indefinitely before  March 7, 
2015. The legislation precludes any judging discretion of the judge, previously 
exercisable even if anchored to the criteria of art. 8 of the Law no. 604/1966 and art. 
18 of the Statute of Workers (Editor's note: Law No. 300/1970) as amended by law 
no. 92/2012, imposing on the same (judge) an automatism on the basis of which the 
worker is entitled, in case of ascertained illegitimacy of the dismissal, the small sum 
of compensation (now) provided.>>. 
 
But let's proceed by order … in the Italian legislative “selva oscura”… 
 
In the last fifty years, in the Italian legal system the protection against illegitimate (i.e. 
unlawful, as not supported by adequate justification) dismissal  has undergone a 
continuous evolution. 
 
Before 1966 the dismissal was “entirely free”   (even in the form, which could be oral; 
i.e. ad nutum) and without necessary justification; the only economic protection was 
constituted by the indemnity of non-notice (established even today by collective 
agreements), however, not due to the hypothesis of "just cause" of dismissal (negative 
event of an essentially fiduciary nature, which does not allow even temporary 
prosecution of the employment relationship). 
 
With the Law no. 604/1966 (thanks to the evolution of collective bargaining whose 
contents were incorporated into the Law) were introduced: the obligation of the written 
form and the motivation of dismissal, and an economic protection (commensurate with 
a number of salary payments, variable from 2.5 to 6, according to the prudent evaluation 
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of the Judge). However, the scope of this economic protection was linked to the size of 
the employer's organization (number of employees). 
The Law no. 604/1966 introduced the following "legal entities" of dismissal: 
“just cause”: behavior of the worker who constitutes a serious violation of his 
contractual obligations, such as to irremediably harm the necessary relationship of trust 
between the parties and that does not allow the temporary or even continuation of the 
employment relationship (civil code, article 2119). Therefore, the "just cause" 
represents, in fact, the disciplinary dismissal par excellence; such as to immediately 
terminate the employment relationship without even paying the notice. Dismissal as 
disciplinary sanction must necessarily be preceded by the activation of the compulsory 
disciplinary procedure and in particular by the prior communication of the "objections 
to charges" in order to allow the employee to defend himself against unfounded 
accusations. Collective agreements normally list hypotheses and facts deemed to 
constitute a “just cause” for dismissal. 
 
 “justified subjective reason” : it is represented by disciplinary behavior of the 
employee but not such as to result in dismissal for “just cause” (i.e. without notice). 
Even the “justified subjective reason” dismissal therefore falls within the disciplinary 
category, still constituting a sanction related to behaviors considered such as to incur in 
an irreparable manner in the regular continuation of the employment relationship. The 
figures of the poor performance and / or negligent behavior of the employee are also 
included in the “justified subjective reason” of dismissal. It constitutes a condition of 
legitimacy of dismissal the prior "challenge of charges" with the right of the employee 
to adequately perform their defense, possibly covered by the assistance of a trade union 
representative. 
 
“justified objective reason” : it is represented by reasons relating to the organization of 
work (for example: the company crisis, the termination of the activity and, even if only, 
the loss of the duties previously assigned to the worker, without it is possible its 
"repechage", or the relocation of the same in other tasks existing in the company and 
compatible with the level of classification). Are also hypotheses of “justified objective 
reason” those in which the worker loses, not through his own fault, the skills necessary 
to perform the tasks for which it was hired. 
 
“oral (verbal)” dismissal : this is the case in which the worker is removed from the 
workplace without any formal act (letter or other similar communication) by the 
employer. 
 
In 1970 the Law no. 300 (Workers' Rights Statute) introduced (for employers - limited 
to “entrepreneurs for profit“ - only and with an organizational dimension of more than 
15 employees) the obligation of reinstatement in the workplace (by order of the Judge) 
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with the consequent right to receive all salaries from the day of the dismissal to that of 
the actual reinstatement ("full-restoring" protection). 
 
In 1990 (to avoid a popular referendum of "expansionist" sign, aimed at extending the 
"full-restoring” protection also to employees of employers who are not entrepreneurs 
and in any case of less organizational size) the Law no. 108 it was issued.  Economic 
protection was strengthened for redundant workers already employed by smaller work 
organizations (the measure of compensation was raised in the new range of 5 to 12 
monthly salaries); it was clarified (actually reiterated) that the person affected by a 
dismissal for discriminatory reasons always had the right to "full-restoring" protection 
(reinstatement in the workplace plus current salaries form the dismissal date to the 
effective     return to work). 
 
 
The Law no. 92/2012 (issued on the inspiration of the <<Troika>>), has completely 
remodeled the protection against illegitimate (unlawful) dismissal (with a degree of 
considerable complexity, according to four different regimes, hardly restricting - firm 
the “full-restoring” protection in cases of discriminatory dismissals - the possibility that 
a worker can to be reinstated). The maximum amount of the indemnity was raised to 24 
months of salary and the minimum amount to 2.5; however, the judge has a certain 
space to determine the measure by adapting it to the specific case. 
*°* 
The legislative innovation that goes under the name of "Jobs Act" has introduced a 
further restriction of protection (always excluding and in any case - except for the 
discriminatory dismissal - the “full-restoring” protection), creating an automatic 
mechanism for determining the indemnity linked to the illegitimate-unlawful dismissal, 
removing any space for the prudent appreciation of the Judge. 
 
In particular, for workers hired on permanent contracts before March 7, 2015, the 
following guarantees apply: 
 
° in the event of dismissal “nullity” (because it is discriminatory, or because it is 
imposed in the course of a marriage or in violation of the protections provided for 
maternity or paternity or in other cases provided for by law) or “ineffective(ness)” 
(because it is requested in oral form), to all workers (regardless of the number of 
employees employed by the employer), is entitled to be reinstated into the workplace 
and to receive a compensation equal to the remuneration accrued from the day of the 
dismissal until the effective reinstatement (so-called “new full-restoring” protection). 
More specifically, in these cases, the judge, declaring the dismissal “invalid” or 
“ineffective”, orders the employer to reinstate the worker in the workplace and 
condemns the employer to compensation for the damage suffered for the period 
following the dismissal and until the effective reinstatement, and (more) the payment of 
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social security and welfare contributions for the entire period between dismissal and 
reinstatement. The compensation for the damage is represented by an indemnity 
commensurate with the last “overall remuneration in fact” matured from the day of the 
dismissal to the day of the actual reinstatement and can not in any case be less than 5 
months (a maximum limit is not provided). From the amount must be deducted what 
may be perceived, during the period of exclusion, for the performance of other work 
activities (s.c. aliunde perceptum).  
Without prejudice to this compensation, the worker has the possibility - within thirty 
days from the notification of the filing of the sentence - to ask the employer, in place of 
the reinstatement in the workplace, an indemnity equal to 15 months of the “last overall 
remuneration in fact”, whose request determines the resolution of the employment 
relationship. 
Apart from the aforementioned hypotheses, the protections vary according to :  the size 
of the employer’s organization  and the type of defect that renders the expulsion 
provision illegitimate(unlawful); in particular: 
 
°° if the dismissal is ordered by an employer who exceeds the dimensional thresholds 
established by art. 18 of the law 300/1970 (production unit with more than 15 workers, 
or more than 5 if it is an agricultural entrepreneur, or more than 60 employees in total), 
the protection regimes established by this rule (as amended by reform of the labor 
market in 2012 by the Law no 92), are applicable and,  in some specific cases, include 
the possibility that the employer is condemned to reinstate the worker in the workplace.   
 
*°* 
Before this legislative innovation, in fact, there was a single protection (so-called 
<<tutela reale>>), which entailed the reinstatement of the worker and a (really) full 
compensation of the damage (with the payment of salaries and contributions from 
dismissal until the actual reinstatement and, in any case , to a minimum of 5 months). 
The new (2012) text of art. 18 of the  Law no. 300, however, provides the following 
protection schemes, which change depending on the defect found (by the judge) in the 
dismissal. 
 
When the terms of the <<justified subjective reason>> or of the <<just cause>>,  for 
the absence of the disputed fact do not occur or because the fact falls within the conduct 
punishable by a conservative sanction, the judge applies the so-called <<tutela reale 
attenuata>> (reinstatement in the workplace and a compensation commensurate with the 
12-month salary limit, in addition to the payment of social security contributions for the 
entire period from the day of the dismissal to that of reinstatement). 
The protection of  <<tutela reale attenuata>>   also applies in cases of: (i) "manifest 
non-existence of the fact based on the dismissal for justified objective reason"; (ii) 
dismissal ordered for objective reason consisting in the physical or mental inability of 
the worker; (iii) termination of dismissal during the period of consignment (Editor's 
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note: period - regulated by collective agreements - for the retention of employment in 
the event of illness, accident or other absence from which the suspension of the 
employment relationship derives). 
 
In the other cases in which any “just cause”, “justified subjective reason”, “justified 
objective reason” do not occur, the judge applies the s.c. <<tutela obbligatoria 
standard>> (compulsory standard protection); i.e. condemns the employer to the 
payment of a compensation (indemnity) commensurate between 12 and 24 months of 
the “last overall remuneration in fact” de facto, taking into account the worker's 
seniority, the number of employees, the size of the economic activity and of the 
behavior and conditions of the parties). The prudent appreciation of the Judge is 
therefore valued. 
 
In cases of illegitimate (unlawful) dismissal due to lack of motivation or failure to 
comply with the procedural obligations laid down for disciplinary dismissal or for a 
justified objective reason, finally, the judge applies the so-called <<tutela obbligatoria 
ridotta>> (compulsory reduced protection); the judge  orders the employer to pay an 
indemnity variable between 6 and 12 months of  the “last overall remuneration in fact”  
(de facto). The  exact amount of compensation is established in relation to the gravity of 
the formal or procedural violation committed by the employer. Also in these cases the 
prudent appreciation of the Judge is valued. 
 
°°° below the above dimensional thresholds, instead finds application the milder 
protection regime provided by art. 8 of the Law no. 604/1966 (as replaced by Article 2 
of Law no. 108/1990), which gives the worker who is illegitimately (unlawly) fired only 
the right to receive purely financial compensation. Regardless of the defect identified, 
the judge annuls the dismissal and condemns the employer to summarize the employee 
within the period of three days, or, failing that, to pay him/her a compensation amount, 
the extent of which is determined between a minimum of 2.5 and a maximum of 6 
monthly payments (taking into account the number of employees employed, the size of 
the company, the length of service of the worker, as well as the behavior and condition 
of the parties). The indemnity can be increased up to 10 months for the employee with 
seniority of more than ten years, and up to 14 months for the employee with seniority 
over 20 years. Also in these cases the prudent appreciation of the Judge is valued. 
 
*°* 
 
We must necessarily examine the protection regimes applicable in the event of the 
unlawful dismissal of a worker hired after 7 March 2015 (i.e. the specific case 
examined by the Roman Judge). 
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Legislative decree no. 23/2015, has introduced in the Italian legal system the s.c. << 
contratto di lavoro a tempo indeterminato a tutele crescenti>> (permanent employment 
contract with increasing protections), implementing the s.c. “Jobs Act” (Law No. 
183/2014), and provides a(n addictionally) new protection regime for the hypothesis of 
illegitimate (unlawful dismissal), intended first to support and then replace the system 
of protection provided for by art. 18 of the Law n. 300/1970 (as modified in 2012). 
 
According to the new regulations, an unfairly dismissed worker will have the right, in 
most cases, to receive only an economic indemnity; the reinstatory protection is instead 
limited to a few residual hypotheses (in the case of discriminatory dismissal, void and 
ineffective because in oral form), with respect to which the Judge, with the 
pronouncement with which declares the nullity or ineffectiveness of the dismissal, 
condemns the employer for the reinstatement of the worker in the workplace, the 
payment of compensation and the payment of social security and welfare contributions. 
In such serious cases, the indemnity is commensurate with the last salary and is payable 
from the day of the dismissal until that of the actual reinstatement (subtracting what was 
perceived by the worker during the period of exclusion, for other work activities: s.c. 
aliunde perceptum); in any case, the indemnity cannot be less than 5 months of salary. 
Without prejudice to the right to receive the aforementioned indemnity, the worker is 
given the faculty to replace the reinstatement in the workplace with a further economic 
compensation, equal to 15 months of the last salary, provided that he makes the request 
within 30 days from the communication of the filing the ruling or by the invitation of 
the employer to resume service, if prior to the communication. The replacement 
compensation for the reinstatement is not subject to social security contributions. 
 
The protections applicable to workers of “larger  employers” (above the thresholds of 
15 or 5 employees) in the event of unlawful dismissal are instead the following. 
 
In the cases of dismissal for "justified subjective reason" or "just cause", in respect of 
which the non-existence of the material fact contested to the worker is proven in court, 
the employer is condemned to reinstate the worker into the workplace and the payment 
of social security and welfare contributions. The employee is also entitled to receive 
compensation indemnity commensurate with the last salary, from the day of the 
dismissal until the effective reinstatement. 
 
This allowance should be subtracted from the amount received by the worker for the 
performance of other work activities (s.c. "aliunde perceptum") and the amounts that the 
worker could have received by accepting a suitable job offer (s.c. “aliunde 
percipiendum”, according to the criteria indicated in art. 4, paragraph 1, letter c), of the 
legislative decree no. 181/2000: the proof must be acquired at the employment office). 
Furthermore, the indemnity cannot be higher than 12 months of salary (while there is no 
  
ISSN: 2174-6419                                                                                      Lex Social, vol. 8, núm. 1  (2018) 
 
231 
 
minimum entity, as established for the other cases of null or ineffective dismissal). Also 
in these cases the prudent appreciation of the Judge is valued. 
 
In all other cases of unjustified individual dismissal or noticed in violation of the 
procedures prescribed by the law (e.g. in terms of disciplinary dismissal), the 
employment relationship is terminated and the employee is only due an indemnity that 
ranges between 4 and 24 monthly payments (from 2 to 12, if it is a procedural 
violation). Also in these cases the prudent appreciation of the Judge is valued. 
 
More specifically, the art. 3, co. 1, of the legislative decree no. 23/2015 establishes that 
in case of dismissal for << justified objective reason >>, for << justified subjective 
reason >> or for << just cause >>, when the judge ascertains the illegitimacy of the 
dismissal, declares the extinction of the employment relationship and sentence the 
employer to pay an indemnity, not subject to social security contribution, of an 
amount equal to 2 monthly salary for each year of service (the basis of calculation is 
constituted, also in this case, by last pay). In any case, the indemnity cannot be less 
than 4 months, nor can it exceed 24 months. Also in these cases the prudent 
appreciation of the Judge is valued. 
Pursuant to art. 10, the same sanctioning regime (indemnity equal to two months for 
each year of service, in any case between 4 and 24 months) is also applicable in cases of 
unlawful collective dismissal for violation of the procedure prescribed by law (in 
particular, the procedures referred to 'article 4, paragraph 12, Law no. 223/1991) or for 
violation of the selection criteria (article 5, paragraph 1, Law no. 223/1991). Also in 
these cases the prudent appreciation of the Judge is valued. 
 
The employee is entitled to a mere economic indemnity even in the case of illegitimate 
unlawful dismissal for violation of the requirement of motivation (Article 2, 
paragraph 2, Law no. 604/1966. In this case, however, the compensation is halved: it 
will be equal to 1 monthly salary for each year of service, with a minimum limit of 2 
months and a maximum limit of 12 months. 
 
Even more diversified are the protections applicable to employees of smaller employers 
in the event of an unlawful dismissal. 
 
With regard to employees in organizations that do not reach the known numerical 
thresholds (15 employees or 5), the art. 9 of the legislative decree no. 23/2015 
establishes that, in respect of these workers, the same protection regime applies to 
employees of larger employers, with two significant differences: reinstatement in the 
hypothesis of disciplinary dismissal is excluded declared illegitimate due to the absence 
of material fact and economic protection is substantially halved. 
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That is to say, in the event of an illegitimate dismissal of a worker employed by a 
"minor employer", reinstatement will only apply in cases of discriminatory, null and 
oral dismissal for reasons of physical or mental disability of the worker. 
 
 
In other cases, the worker will be entitled exclusively to an economic indemnity, 
calculated as follows: 
 
° in the case of dismissal ordered for "just cause", for "justified subjective reason" or 
"justified objective reason", if the judge ascertains the illegitimacy of the dismissal, the 
worker is granted compensation (not subjected social security contribution) of an 
amount equal to 1 monthly salary for each year of service; in any case, the indemnity 
cannot be less than 2 months, nor can it exceed 6 months; 
 
°° in the event of an unlawful dismissal for "violation of the obligation to state reasons" 
pursuant to art. 2, paragraph 2, of Law no. 604/1966, or, in the hypothesis of 
disciplinary dismissal, for << violation of the procedure >> provided for by art. 7 of the 
Law n. 300/1970 (Editor's note: and from the applicable collective agreement, must be 
considered), the employee is entitled to an indemnity (not subject to social security 
contribution) equal to half a month for each year of service, with a minimum limit of 1 
month and a maximum limit of 6 months. 
 
*°* 
Conciliation offer (really a masterpiece of cynicism…) 
 
Legislative decree no. 23/2015 provides for a new conciliation procedure, aimed at 
speeding up the definition of the dismissal dispute, which provides for the immediate 
payment of compensation by the employer. 
 
In particular, the art. 6 of the decree establishes that, in the event of dismissal, the 
employer, in order to avoid judgment, within the terms of extrajudicial appeal of 
dismissal (60 days), may summon the worker to one of the conciliatory offices indicated 
in the fourth paragraph of the 'art. 2113 of the Italian Civil Code (including, in 
particular, conciliation commissions at the territorial labor departments and those 
established by art. 76 of the legislative decree no. 276/ 2003, as certification 
commissions according to the conciliation body), and to offer him/her a cashier's check 
for an amount equal to one month's salary for each year of service, and in any case not 
less than 2 months and not more than 18 months. 
To encourage this type of solution, the legislator has provided that such 
compensation does not constitute taxable income for the employee and is not 
subject to social security contributions. 
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The acceptance of the check by the worker entails the termination of the employment 
relationship on the date of dismissal and the waiver of the challenge of dismissal even if 
the worker has already proposed it. 
 
*°* 
The new regulations introduced in 2015 concern all workers hired with a permanent 
employment contract with effect from the date of entry into force of the decree (March 
7, 2015). 
Workers already hired before this date will continue to benefit from the protection 
regimes provided for by art. 18 (Law no. 300/1970 as modified in 2012), provided that, 
of course, they are assumed in structures that exceed the numerical thresholds required 
by law (production unit with more than 15 workers, or more than 5 if it is an 
agricultural entrepreneur, or more than 60 employees in total). In the immediate term, 
therefore, for these workers nothing changes. 
In the event that the employer, as a result of new open-ended hiring after 7 March 2015, 
reaches the size thresholds provided for by art. 18 (15 or 5 employees), all the workers 
(old and new hired) will fully apply the new rules of the << contratto a tutele 
crescenti>>, and the related sanctions regime envisaged in the event of an illegitimate 
unlawful dismissal. 
Likewise, the new regulations will also be applied in the cases of conversion, after 7 
March 2015, of a fixed-term employment contract or an apprenticeship contract, into a 
permanent employment contract. 
Workers already hired indefinitely before March 7, 2015, although not affected by 
regulatory changes to date, may still be in the future, when they change jobs, 
transitioning into the condition of "new hires" with a different employer. 
=0= 
This (not brief) premise was necessary to understand (forgive the headache but the 
Italian legislator is sometimes really harmful … ) the real meaning of the choice of the 
Roman Judge. 
 
It should be noted, first of all, that the Judge has - in a dispute characterized by the 
default of the employer - relieved ex officio the question of constitutionality of the 
aforementioned rule. 
This circumstance, in concrete procedural dynamics, suggests that the Judge had for 
some time "metabolized" the legal construction of the profiles of suspected 
unconstitutionality of the rule and, at the first useful opportunity, formalized it in terms 
that can easily be appreciated in the full text of the ordinance. 
The focal point (which highlights the unreasonable "imbalance" of economic protection 
in the event of unlawful dismissal) is as follows (using the same words of the Judge): 
<< Believes this judge that, given the extreme generality of the motivation alleged and 
of the absolute lack of proof of the merits of some of the circumstances laconically 
mentioned in the expulsion, the visible vice is the most serious among those indicated, 
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namely the "non recurrence of the details of the dismissal for justified objective 
reason" (in the language of legislator of 2015), or the "manifest lack of the fact made 
on the basis of dismissal for justified objective reason. In short, if it had been hired 
before 7 March 2015, the applicant would have enjoyed the reinstatement protection 
and an indemnity commensurate with twelve monthly payments (having passed after 
12 months between expulsion and the first hearing), or, applying paragraph 5 of the 
art. 18 of the Law no. 300/1970, only for indemnity protection between 12 and 24 
months; whereas, to be hired after that date, she is only entitled to four monthly 
payments, and only because the defendant's default allows for the presumption of the 
size requirement to be presumptuous, otherwise the amount of compensation would 
have been two months pays. Even if a mere defect of the motivation was found, the 
protection in the vigor of the art. 18 would have been much more substantial (6-12 
months of compensation for 2). >> 
 
*°* 
Delimited the thema decidendum in terms of reconstruction of the quantum of economic 
protection linked to unlawful dismissal in the specific case, the Judge outlined the 
different profiles of unconstitutionality of the rules applied (Article 1, paragraph 7, letter 
c) of the Law (delegated by Parliament ) n. 183/2014; Articles. 2, 4 and 10 of the 
Legislative Decree (delegate, issued by the Government) n. 23/2015), in light of the 
different parameters of constitutional rank (articles 3, 4, 35, 76 and 117, of the 
Constitution of the Italian Republic, breviter: CostRI) 
 
The relevance of the question of suspected unconstitutionality is based on the 
unreasonableness of the regulatory innovation introduced in the period 2014-2015 by 
the Italian legislator; in fact the new discipline deprives the recurring worker << of most 
of the protections still in force for those who have been hired indefinitely before 
March, 7 2015. The legislation precludes any judging discretion of the judge, 
previously exercisable even if anchored to the criteria set forth in art. 8 of the law no. 
604/1966 and art. 18 of the Statute of Workers (Editor's note: Law no. 300/1970) as 
amended by Law no. 92/2012, imposing to the same (judge) an automatism on the 
basis of which the worker is entitled, in case of ascertained illegitimacy of the 
dismissal, the small sum of compensation provided. >>. 
 
In the Italian legal system the parameters of constitutionality interested in the case 
referred to in the ordinance of the Roman Judge are: 
 
° Article 3 - CostRI ("All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the 
law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, personal 
and social conditions. the obstacles of an economic and social order which, by 
limiting the freedom and equality of citizens, prevent the full development of the 
human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, economic 
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and social organization of the country. " ), as the amount of the compensation 
indemnity drawn up by the provisions of the s.c. "Jobs Act" is neither compensatory 
nor dissuasive and has discriminatory consequences; furthermore, the total 
elimination of the judge's discretionary judgment ends up in a uniform way to regulate 
very dissimilar cases (violating the principle of reasonableness, mirroring the principle 
of equality); 
 
 
°° article 4 - CostRI ("The Republic recognizes all citizens the right to work and 
promotes the conditions that make this right effective." Every citizen has the duty to 
perform, according to their possibilities and their choice, an activity or a function that 
contributes to the material or spiritual progress of society. ") and article 35 - CostRI (" 
The Republic protects work in all its forms and applications, it takes care of the 
training and professional development of workers. and international organizations 
aimed at affirming and regulating labor rights . Recognizing the freedom of 
emigration, except for the obligations established by law in the general interest, and 
protecting Italian work abroad. "), as - in the opinion of the Roman Judge - << to the 
right to work, the founding value of the Charter (Editor's note : the Judge refers to 
the CostRI), a monetary countervalue In a derisory way  and in a fixed amount is 
attributed >>; 
 
°°° article 117 - CostRI ("The legislative power is exercised by the State and the 
Regions in compliance with the Constitution, as well as the constraints deriving from 
the community and international obligations. (...)") and Article 76 - Costri (" The 
exercise of the legislative function can not be delegated to the Government except 
with the determination of principalities and managerial criteria and only for limited 
time and for definite objects. "), as - in the opinion of the Roman Judge - << the 
"sanction" for the illegitimate unlawful dismissal  appears inadequate compared 
to what has been supranational sources such as the Charter of Nice and the 
European Social Charter, while compliance with EU regulations and 
supranational conventions was a precise proxy, which is was therefore violated. >>. 
In this regard it should be noted that the Law (proxy) no. 183/2014, article 7, paragraph 
1, with explicit reference to "dismissal for justified reason" indicates as a general 
criterion the "consistency with the regulation of the European Union and 
international conventions". 
 
*°* 
 
With less consistency of argumentation, the Roman Judge identifies the supranational 
rank standards violated (in terms of "non-compliance") by the 2014-2015 reform: 
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i) Article 30 of the Nice Charter (2012/C 326/02 - CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION - CFREU ), 
where it requires Member States to ensure adequate protection in the event 
of unjustified unlawful dismissal : << Protection in the event of unjustified 
dismissal. Every worker has the right to protection against unjustified 
dismissal, in accordance with Union law and national laws and 
practices.>> ;  
ii) ILO C158 - Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158): it 
requires that << Article 10 If the bodies referred to in Article 8 of this 
Convention find that termination is unjustified and if they are not 
empowered or do not find it practicable, in accordance with national law 
and practice, to declare the termination invalid and/or order or propose 
reinstatement of the worker, they shall be empowered to order payment of 
adequate compensation or such other relief as may be deemed 
appropriate.>>.  
(It should be noted that Italy has not ratified this Convention, see:   
                        
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11210:0::NO:11210:P11210_COUNTRY
_ID:102709 ); 
 
iii) Article 24 of the European Social Charter (ESC) which establishes:<< 
The right to protection in cases of termination of employment. With a view 
to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of workers to protection in 
cases of termination of employment, the Parties undertake to recognize: a. 
the right of all workers not to have their employment terminated without 
valid reasons for such termination connected with their capacity or 
conduct or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, 
establishment or service; b. the right of workers whose employment is 
terminated without a valid reason to adequate compensation or other 
appropriate relief. To this end, the Parties undertake to ensure that a 
worker who considers that his employment has been terminated without a 
valid reason shall have the right to appeal to an impartial body.>>.  
 
In this last regard, with great methodological correctness, the Roman Judge has 
identified the “living law” which defines the characters of << appropriateness >> of the 
compensation  and << adequacy >>  of the relief, guaranteed by the ESC to the workers, 
in some decisions  of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR). 
 
In these rulings, the Committee, while acknowledging that the restorative measure may 
not be of a recurring nature but merely indemnity, has affirmed that the relief must be 
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adequate (from the worker's point of view) and dissuasive (from point of view of the 
employer). 
 
With two separate decisions of January 31, 2017 (Complaints : No. 106/2014 and No. 
107/2014, both with regard to Finland), the Committee interpreted Article 24 of the 
ESC (Editor's note: in the Revised (1996) text), solicited thanks to collective complaints 
promoted by the Finnish Society of Social Rights (which had complained of the 
violation of Article 24 of the Charter in relation to the Finnish national provisions which 
provided, on the one hand, the conditions for ordering a dismissal for justified objective 
reasons, and on the other , the employer's responsibility in case of illegitimate unlawful 
dismissal), to identify the limits that the national legislator must not go beyond. 
 
The ECSR (in particular in points 45 to 54 of the decision on complaint no. 106/2014), 
has in fact clarified (with expressions valid for all countries that have joined the 
ESC without explicit reservations on the formula of Article 24, in the revised text 
of 1996) that, under the Charter, << to employees dismissed without justified reason 
adequate compensation or other appropriate remedies must be granted; the 
compensation mechanism is considered appropriate (point 45) when it provides: 
 
- reimbursement of financial losses incurred between the date of dismissal and the 
decision of the appeal body; 
-  possibility of reinstatement; 
- compensation at a level high enough to dissuade the employer and make good the 
damage suffered by the employee. >>. 
 
In the decision on Complaint n. 106/2014 the ECSR has affirmed other fundamental 
evaluation criteria : 
<<(46.) Any upper limit on compensation that may preclude damages from being 
commensurate with the loss suffered and sufficiently dissuasive is in principle, 
contrary to the Charter. However, if there is such a ceiling on compensation for 
pecuniary damage, the victim must be able to seek compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage through other legal avenues (e.g. anti-discrimination legislation) 
(Conclusions 2012, Slovenia). 
i) Adequate compensation 
(47.) As regards the allegation that Finland is in breach of Article 24 of the Charter 
on the grounds that the Employment Contracts Act provides for a limit on the amount 
of compensation that may be awarded in the event of an unlawful dismissal the 
Committee recalls that in Conclusions 2008 it found that the situation in Finland was 
not in conformity with that provision of the Charter on the ground that compensation 
for unlawful dismissal was subject to an upper limit of no more than 24 months pay. 
However, in its subsequent conclusions (Conclusions 2012) it noted that in certain 
cases of unlawful dismissal compensation may also be awarded under the Tort 
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Liability Act, and requested information on cases where an employee has successfully 
sought compensation under the Tort Liability Act in a case of unlawful dismissal. 
Meanwhile, it found the situation to be in conformity with Article 24 of the Charter 
(Conclusions 2012, Finland). The Finnish Society of Social Rights maintains that the 
Tort Liability Act is only applicable if real harm or damage has been inflicted on the 
employee. 
(48.) The Government states that employees may in addition to the Employment 
Contracts Act seek compensation for unlawful dismissal under the Non-
Discrimination Act and the Act on Equality between Women and Men. However, the 
Committee notes that only persons who were dismissed on discriminatory grounds 
may seek compensation under these pieces of legislation. In a case of unfair 
dismissal, not having a discriminatory element, it is not possible to claim 
compensation under them. 
(49.) The Committee considers that in some cases of unfair dismissal an award of 
compensation of 24 months as provided for under the Employment Contracts Act may 
not be sufficient to make good the loss and damage suffered. 
(50.) The Government highlights that employees, who have been unlawfully 
dismissed, may seek compensation in addition under the Tort Liability Act. 
(51.) The Committee also notes that the Government in its submissions on the merits 
has provided no examples of cases where compensation has been awarded for unfair 
dismissal under the Tort Liability Act. In its 11th report under the reporting 
procedure the Government cites a judgment of the Helsinki Court of Appeal 
upholding an District Court decision awarding compensation under the Tort Liability 
Act in a case of discriminatory dismissal, where compensation had also been sought 
on the basis of the Employment Contracts Act and the Non-Discrimination Act. The 
Committee notes that this case concerned discriminatory dismissal. The Committee 
notes that the Tort Liability Act does not apply in all situations of unlawful dismissal, 
and may only be applicable in restricted situations. In particular, it notes that the Tort 
Liability Act does not apply in respect of contractual liability or liability provided for 
in another act, unless otherwise specified. 
(52.) The Committee finds that the Tort Liability Act does not provide a fully-fledged 
alternative legal avenue for the victims of unlawful dismissal not linked to 
discrimination. 
(53.) The Committee considers that the upper limit to compensation provided for by 
the Employment Contracts Act may result in situations where compensation awarded 
is not commensurate with the loss suffered. In addition, it cannot conclude that 
adequate alternative other legal avenues are available to provide a remedy in such 
cases. 
(54.) Therefore the Committee holds that there is a violation of Article 24 of the 
Charter. 
Conclusions 
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- by 7 votes to 4, that there is a violation of Article 24 of the Charter, on the issue of 
compensation; 
- unanimously, that there is a violation of Article 24 of the Charter on the issue of 
reinstatement.>>. 
 
=0= 
 
For intellectual honesty it must be said that the decision of the Committee has 
recognized the violation of article 24 also with reference to the question of 
reinstatement. This issue is not placed in the foreground in the order of the Roman 
judge. Moreover, the reference to the decision on Complaint n. 107 is not relevant 
because the Committee's conclusion is : << there Is no violation of Article 24 >>. 
 
*°* 
 
According to the Roman Judge:<< It follows that, in principle, any compensation 
limit that precludes a "compensation" commensurate with the loss suffered and 
sufficiently dissuasive is contrary to the Charter. In the present case, the Finnish 
legislation provided for a limit of 24 months of pay as the maximum limit for 
compensation for the damage from unlawful dismissal. In this context, the 
Committee notes that the maximum limit of compensation provided by law can 
lead to situations in which compensation awarded is not commensurate with the 
loss suffered: it follows that the plafonnement of compensation complements a 
violation of Article 24 of the Charter. >>. 
 
To this fundamental passage of the motivation of the Roman Judge order binds the 
successive one that specifically concerns the Italian legislative evolution (situation 
before the reform 2014-2015). 
 
It also detects that: << Also in the 2016 conclusions (Editor's note: National Report of 
the Committee on Italy, whose horizon stops in 2014, see in: https://rm.coe.int/activity-
report-ecsr-2016-final-17-03 -2017/1680701072, page 37) concerning the Italian 
legislation in force in 2014 (and therefore to Law No. 92/2012), the Committee has 
recalled that any ceiling such as to determine the recognized allowances not to be 
related to the prejudice suffered and sufficiently dissuasive.>>. 
 
Nonetheless - argues the Roman judge - the ESC must be considered, like the ECHR, 
as an “interposed source” (and in this sense,  see: Italian Constitutional Court, ruling  
No. 178/2015); in any case, as mentioned, the alleged violation of supranational 
principles is to support the assessment of the contrast of the legislation under 
examination with the articles. 3, 4 and 35 of the CostRI,  on the justification of the 
unequal treatment of workers seeking employment and workers already employed in 
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March 2015 and violation of the commitment to promote international agreements and 
organizations aimed at establishing and regulating the rights work (third paragraph of 
Article 35 CostRI). 
 
 
The contrast with the CostRI (it should be noted) << does not occur because of the 
elimination of reinstatement protection - if not for the null dismissals, discriminatory 
and for specific cases of disciplinary dismissal (Article 1, paragraph 7, letter c),  Law 
(proxy) n. 183/2014) - and therefore because of the full “monetization” of the 
guarantee offered to the worker: indeed the Italian Constitutional Court has already 
repeatedly ruled that reinstatement protection is not the only possible paradigm for the 
implementation of the constitutional precepts set forth in Articles. 4 and 35 (see Italian 
Constitutional Court, rulings No. 46/2000 and No. 303/2011).>>. 
 
The suspicion of unconstitutionality says the Roman Judge << is here formulated, 
instead, by reason of the concrete discipline of compensation which, in 
compensating only for the equivalent of the unjust damage suffered by the worker, 
is now also destined to take the place of the concurrent compensation in a specific 
form constituted from reinstatement protection (which has become a protection 
for a few cases of exceptional gravity) and therefore should have been much more 
substantial and adequate.>>. 
 The Italian Constitutional Court has indeed stated on several occasions, most recently 
in the aforementioned ruling No. 303/2011, that "the general rule of completeness of 
the reparation and equivalence of the same to the damage caused to the injured 
person has no constitutional cover" (ruling No. 148/1999)  provided that the 
adequacy of the compensation is guaranteed (rulings No. 199/2005 and No. 
420/1991)”. 
 
And this is precisely the specific profile with respect to which the legislation in 
question does not escape the doubt of constitutionality. 
 
*°* 
 
2. Some reflections on the way followed by the Roman Judge … 
 
§.1. Of the three sources of supranational law, only Article 24 ESC appears to be 
effective for resolving the specific case. 
 
Indeed the ILO 158 convention has not been ratified by Italy; it cannot have the 
character of an interposed standard. 
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In fact, Article 30 of the Charter of the fundamental rights of the European Union 
(CFREU) does not have the characteristics of a preceptive rule but at the most it has the 
nature of a principle with a programmatic function; in its formula echoes the fear of not 
disrupting national laws and practices 
 
*°* 
§.2. Significantly, the Roman Judge has not indicated as a parameter of constitutionality 
violated the art. 10 of the Italian Constitution (Article 10, par. 1, CostRI -  << The 
Italian legal system conforms to the generally recognized norms of international law 
>> ).  And perhaps this in the fear that the Italian Constitutional Court would not focus 
on the specific theme governed by Article 24 of the ESC which is still an International 
Treaty … 
 
Indeed the “interpretative experience” of the article 10 CostRI by the Italian 
Constitutional Court is rather "conservative", and the Roman Judge has considered 
observing the rule clarified by the same Italian Constitutional Court which states the 
following: << The common judge is responsible for interpreting the internal law in 
accordance with the provision international, within the limits in which this is 
permitted by the texts of the rules. If this is not the case possible, or doubt the 
compatibility of the internal standard with the conventional provision "Interposed", 
he must invest this Court of the relative question of constitutional legitimacy with 
respect to the parameter of art. 117, first paragraph (ruling No. n. 349/2007). >> 
 
 
3. Scenarios of the case solution and the alternative paths  
 
As a result, the Roman Judge decided to follow the "quieter" route : to present the 
question on the table of the competent constitutional body. 
 
What could be the approach of the Italian Constitutional Court to the question raised? 
 
Let's try to outline some hypotheses, also using the ad excludendum technique … 
 
§.a. with almost absolute probability the Italian Constitutional Court (ICostC) will not 
invest the CJEU court of justice of the European union, since the legal basis (article 30 
CFREU) appears too uncertain and indeed suitable to provoke aporìa and tautology in 
the search for the applicable legal background and the limits of its application. 
 
§.b. the ICostC could apply the criteria indicated in the ECSR Decision on complaint 
no. 106/2014 and "baptizing" them with a “license of constitutionality” (a sort of 
compatibility with the Italian Constitution … even if it seems a paradoxical nostalgic 
tribute to the idol of sovereignty …) and to declare the question of constitutionality 
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raised by the Roman judge well founded, with a double possibility: declare the 
immediate cancellation of the rules reported (by contrast with Article 76 CostRI, for 
violation of the limits of legislative delegation), or invoke a warning to the legislator to 
identify urgently a normative solution (assuming that the Government, as the delegated 
legislator still has the power to make corrective to the legislative decree No. 23/2015 ...) 
that guarantees compliance with the supranational rank rule (art. 24 o the ESC). 
 
§.c. the ICostC could reject the question, as groundless, motivating in the sense that the 
legislator has correctly used its normative power, in defining the monetary protection 
level (quantum) granted (to) the dismissed workers after having been hired after March 
2015. Such a ruling could be hardly criticized because it seems unreasonable to 
establish a “wall” between protection levels only discriminating on the basis of  an 
event not dependent on the wishes of the worker  but rather from its counterpart: the 
date of employment. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that in the spring of 2018 
parliamentary elections will be held in Italy and that some political groups have 
included in their program the abrogation of the s.c.  “Jobs Act”.  
 
*°* 
 
In a different perspective … 
 
§.A. could the Roman judge directly evaluate and affirm the non-conformity of the 
Italian Law with Article 24 of the ESC ? 
 
 
In the opinion of the IConstC itself, such direct assessment would be precluded only in 
the case in which << If this is not the case possible, or doubt the compatibility of the 
internal standard with the conventional provision "Interposed", he must invest this Court 
of the relative question of constitutional legitimacy with respect to the parameter of art. 
117, first paragraph >> (ruling No. n. 349/2007).  
 
This means that the referral to the Constitutional Court is necessary only when the 
judge of merit’s doubt is real and concrete. 
 
Therefore the Italian legal system does not strictly forbid the judges of merit to 
decide directly on the non-conformity of a national rule with respect to a 
supranational sourced standard. 
 
This seems to be the path taken by the Spanish labor judges, with appreciable results in 
terms of effectiveness and speed of resolution of non-compliance issues, in many trials 
in the last years, although Spain has not ratified the additional ESC protocol on 
collective complaints (see: SALCEDO BELTRAN Carmen, Les litiges en matière 
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d’emploi au regard de la Charte Sociale Européenne – Speech-paper at the 
international Conference "Social rights in Europe today: the role of national and 
European courts ", organized in Nicosia on February 24,  2017 by the Supreme Court of 
Cyprus and the Council of Europe,  at: https://rm.coe.int/16806fe3b3 ; more recently : 
SALCEDO BELTRAN Carmen, Derechos sociales versus medidas de austeridad: 
jurisprudencia del guardian europeo de los derechos sociales, Speech-paper at the 
international Conference "La Carta Social Europea. Pilar fundamental de las politicas 
sociales regionales in Europa”, organized in Valencia on  November 16, 2017 by the 
Spanish Section of RACSE-ANESC and the Direction for UE relationship of the 
Generalitat Valenciana). 
 
*°* 
 
4. Last remarks : ESC, CFREU and supranational scope of paths of protection of 
social rights 
 
What's at stake : :  ζωή με ευρωπαϊκή διάσταση ;  neither more nor less than life with an 
European dimension … with an “European breath”. 
 
In a context of extreme socio-economic emergency that widens the gap between 
“formal” statements (including constitutional status in many countries of the enlarged 
European area) of social rights and measures of drastic revision of the levels of 
protection of national welfare ad labour law systems, the provisions contained in the 
two Charters they constitute the legal foundation of the control of the effectiveness of 
the enjoyment of the rights in question. 
The two distinct (but mutually permeable) models of regulation represented by the two   
Charters suggest paths of protection of supranational scope, in which, through different 
but not idiosyncratic "remedies", the real behaviors of individual member Countries can 
be brought "to emergence" adherents, in a unitary and dynamic vision - in an 
evolutionary sense - of the level of protection of each element of the genus "social 
rights" (obviously interpreted in light of the constitutional traditions of the member 
Countries themselves). 
The collective complaint procedure before the European Social Rights Committee 
(ECSR) and the EU infringement procedure (due to the formal and substantial insertion 
of the CFREU into the EU Treaty system, pursuant to Article 6 of the TEU) can well 
represent the "window" from which to observe (and recall) the member Countries for 
the adoption of "non-regressive" policies regarding the actual enjoyment of social rights 
in the relevant territory. 
 
The scientific debate (and the path of virtuous implementation, on the political-
institutional level) related to the relations between the two sources of regulation placed 
at the center of our attention seems focused - perhaps excessively formalistic - on the 
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genetic aspects of the legal relations between the two systems (Council of Europe and 
European Union), with particular reference to the situation of subjective impasse (see: 
GUIGLIA Giovanni (2011); more recently:  GUIGLIA Giovanni, Alcune proposte per 
favorire le relazioni e le sinergie tra il diritto dell'Unione europea e la Carta sociale 
europea, Speech-paper at the international Conference "La Carta Social Europea. Pilar 
fundamental de las politicas sociales regionales in Europa”, organized in Valencia on  
November 16, 2017). 
 
From the substantive point of view (the one that most interests in order to fill the 
protection of social rights in the European legal space with content ( see: HÄBERLE 
(2003), 199 ss.; POLI (2014)) the question that has almost monopolized the attention of 
the experts is perhaps a τόπος that can be overcome with a strong call to the principle of 
effectiveness (FONTANA (2014)), looking at the original intention of the founders of 
the Council of Europe and the European Communities. 
 
This rediscovery of the inspiration of the overall design of "a life with a European 
breath" (ζωή με ευρωπαϊκή διάσταση ..., it would be to declaim this verse ...) is in the 
sign of the Lisbon Treaty and in the wake of the very idea of social cohesion called in 
the TEU, in full harmony with the common commitment to harmonize welfare systems 
(as set out in the European Social Security Code - ECSS, issued in 1964), which led to 
the subsequent drafts of the European Social Charter. 
 
Therefore, if it is certainly not to neglect any effort to achieve the formal adhesion of 
the European Union to the ESC (and in any case to give new impetus to the institutional 
relations between the European Union and the Council of Europe), we must also 
strongly recall the value (non-nominal) of the formulas chosen in the Preambles of the 
two Charters (ESC and CFREU). 
 
These formulas (even the twelve tables, after all were formulas ...) constitute the plot on 
which the juridical-social relations between Person and State must interweave (as well 
as between States and between these and the supranational reference organizations, in a 
choral spirit free from egoisms and reservations) in the model of "life with European 
breath", that is, a life worth living. 
 
Maximum convergence in the implementation of the two regulatory systems must 
therefore be sought in the concrete legal-social experience of each Country concerned. 
 
If it is true that the subjective effectiveness of the two Charters is largely coincident, it 
should be noted that many States - which also play a very important role in the political 
and institutional life of the European Union - have not, so far, intended to sign the 
Protocol addition to the ESC on collective complaints. 
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In recent years, in fact, the ECSR, which has the task of examining such acts of impulse 
/ control (really fundamental for achieving the objectives of effective protection of 
social rights in the vast European sphere), has assumed an increasingly incisive role in 
the assessment of the overall behavior of each of the member states (both as legislator 
and as a public administrative authority, on this last aspect, see: MONACO (2012)). 
 
The type of assessment that is carried out by the ECSR in the examination of collective 
complaints is of a different nature from that made by the institutions of the European 
Union in the areas of competence, with reference to the different legal sources that 
express the will of the Union itself. 
And in fact, not by chance, the entire Title VII of the CFREU is dedicated to a sort of 
actio finium regundorum: the obvious concern is that - on the one hand - not to 
overflow from the confines of the law of Union, united with that - on the other hand - 
not to provoke "disharmony" with respect to the "common" constitutional traditions of 
the member States. 
 
The ambiguity of this formula (Article 52, paragraph 4) is not too hidden, although it 
must be read in the light of the fifth paragraph of the Preamble (which refers to the 
reaffirmation of  “the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional 
traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social 
Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human Rights”, 
significantly silent on the role of the ECSR … 
 
And more (Article 52, par. 5) : “The provisions of this Charter which contain principles 
may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are 
implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be 
judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their 
legality.“. 
 
And, with an accent that is still "prudent" (Article 52, par. 6) :“Full account shall be 
taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter.“. 
 
This "prudence" also echoes in the TUE formulas (Article 6): “1.The Union recognises 
the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, 
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.  The provisions of the Charter 
shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties. The 
rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with 
the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and 
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application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set 
out the sources of those provisions.  2. The Union shall accede to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such 
accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties.  3. 
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
Union's law.“. 
 
On the front of “justiciability“  (which must always be remembered, it is only one 
element of the effectiveness of any source of any level, see: PICCHI (2012); TEGA 
(2012); CHIARELLA (2011)) it is evident the concern of in any case guarantee a 
certain degree of homogeneity. 
And in fact, the same Article 52 provides: “7. The explanations drawn up as a way of 
providing guidance in the interpretation of this Charter shall be given due regard by the 
Courts of the Union and of the Member States.". 
 
It should be noted, however, that this provision remained empty of substance as the 
institution holding this hermeneutic task (not properly ispired to nomofilachìa, which is 
the prerogative of the CJEU), namely: the Praesidium mentioned in the Preamble of the 
Charter itself recited the part of the mute Sibilla. 
The reasons for this overall attitude on the part of the institutions of the Union (and in 
particular the Praesidium who edited the CFREU) have been masterfully illustrated by 
Klaus Stern in a Seminar (June 2014) held at the University of Verona and dedicated to 
young scholars participating in the interdisciplinary research doctorate in public 
relations coordinated by Alessio Zaccaria; the illustrious speaker, taking up the analysis 
already formulated with absolute rigor in previous writings (STERN 2005 and STERN 
2006) highlighted the intrinsic limits of the Charter in comment, as a legal "tool". 
Basically, the embankment represented by Title VII prevents "expansive" readings of its 
formulas, which, therefore, must always be traced back to the positive law of the Union, 
with every known limit, especially in the normative genesis of individual acts 
(Directives, Recommendations, etc.). 
 
In particular, the real meaning of the following expression contained in the CFREU 
Preamble must be well understood: “Enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities 
and duties with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future 
generations.”. 
 
The identification of the subjective scope of CFREU cannot ignore the answer to the 
fundamental question: who are the "others"? 
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It is to be excluded that these are other Member States of the Union, since the common 
legal framework of the formulas contained in CFREU (they concern both "rights", 
"freedom" and "principles") involve the relationship between the Person and the 
Member State. as well as that between Person and Institutions of the Union. 
 
There is only one answer: the "others" are all the subjects to whom it is possible to 
attribute responsibilities of legal importance in terms of effectiveness (Union 
institutions, Member States and other bodies governed by public law, private entities, 
both individual and collective); the English text bears, incidentally, the expression 
"regard to other persons" ... 
Especially since the active subjective gradient of responsibility involves (none other) 
that the "human community" and "future generations" ... 
 
This is not the place to carry out a complete analysis on the degree of awareness in the 
use of the different semantic expressions in the work of drawing up the Charter (and in 
particular, the expressions often used in a fungible way: "rights", "freedom", 
"Principles") by the editors of CFREU; nevertheless, it should be excluded that the 
"responsibility" and the "duties" mentioned in the CFREU Preamble are attributable 
only to the category of "rights"  understood in a formal sense; this is because "liberties" 
escape the right / obligation schema, to say nothing of the programmatic (but effective 
on the ontological) function of the "Principles". 
And it cannot in any case reasonably be maintained that even from these last legal 
figures do not descend "responsibility" and "duties" 
*** 
In any case, the time has truly come to overtake the traditional "static" visions of the 
normative system of social rights in the European legal space, as this approach risks 
favoring - even without intending to be a former professed - or otherwise endorsing a 
"resigned" and “depressed vision of social Europe” (DI STANI (2014), GIUBBONI 
(2014), POLI (2014), FONTANA (2013)). 
 
In other words: Europe is, even before a market, a "place of the spirit"; this vision 
corresponds to the feeling one feels when entering and walking in a familiar and not 
hostile place, where the human being is considered a Person and not a mere recipient of 
goods and services. 
 
For this reason it is necessary to start and strengthen a flow of paths, of different 
provenance and technical-legal motivation, but all converging to give reason and 
solution to the problems that are posed in the various competent institutions7Bodies; the 
polar star (the simplest and brightest in the firmament) consists of a pure question: 
repugnat aut non repugnat  (to the European feel – i.e. Ευρωπαϊκή αίσθηση  , to the 
European breathe – i.e. Ευρωπαϊκή αναπνέουμε )   what I am reading, what I am seeing 
and what I am listening to? 
  
ISSN: 2174-6419                                                                                      Lex Social, vol. 8, núm. 1  (2018) 
 
248 
 
 
This is the question that every juridical-institutional operator has to ask when he/she 
reflects on any problem of "compatibility" of a given (normative, of practice, etc.) that 
arises from the comparison between the individual national experience and the formulas 
expressed in the two Charters. 
 
The mention (more than an "external reference") contained in the second "considering" 
of the TEU Preamble to the ESC, in conjunction with that of the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989 (sic ... and not to the CFREU ..., but 
must be of a typo in the work of drafting the consolidated version (2012) of the TUE ..., 
as in Article 6 the reference to the latter is correctly performed also from the formal 
point of view ...), it would be little more than a “nodded hello“ to the patient activity 
carried out in the Council of Europe, if the formula of Article 6 TEU had not been 
issued, which provides: “1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles 
set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 
2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal 
value as the Treaties.“.   
From which it could be inferred that (at least in a mediated way) we would be faced 
with a "reference" to the ESC, through the formulas contained in the Preamble of the 
CFREU. 
 
However, the formula of Article 6 TEU goes on: “The provisions of the Charter shall 
not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.“ 
(Editor’s note: of the EU). 
 
And even more emphasizing the groove in the attempt to establish the boundaries 
beyond which not "overflowing", adds : “The rights, freedoms and principles in the 
Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of 
the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the 
explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.“. 
 
It is even more regrettable that, in practice, these "explanations" are left to the CJEU 
and not to the Praesidium ... 
There is also a concern to clarify that: “2. The Union shall accede to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such 
accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties. 3. 
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
Union's law.“. 
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This clarification seems to be directed, indeed, precisely to the CJEU, as well as to the 
EU legislator. 
 
*** 
A greater awareness of the importance of the virtuous interaction between the two 
Charters, in terms of effectiveness, is undoubtedly expressed in the formula of Article 
151 TFEU: 
“The Union and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such as 
those set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in 
the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, shall have 
as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working 
conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being 
maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the 
development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the 
combating of exclusion.“. 
 
There is no doubt that the expression "having in mind" is something (from the point of 
view of the quality of legal commitment) of a far lesser extent than formal adhesion or 
even a formula of possible emanation on the theoretical level, such as: "undertake to 
respect"; at the same time, looking at the substance (in teleological function), however, 
the expression that identifies the common objectives (to the Union and to the Member 
States, this is expressed in the text very clearly) must be fully exploited: “the promotion 
of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their 
harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, 
dialogue between management and labour“. 
 
These objectives are clearly functionalized for improving employment and fighting 
social exclusion : “a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion. “. 
 
It is not a simply coincidence that the entire Title X of the TFEU is dedicated to 
identifying the tasks and responsibilities  of both the Union and the Member States in 
this huge job, of ultragenerational relevance. 
 
Now, to consider the real meaning of the formulas adopted by the various subjects 
(European Union and Council of Europe) in the various acts analyzed, we can see that 
there is no longer any alibi for a "lukewarm" attitude towards social rights in the 
European legal area (and system). 
The formulas (especially the Preambles of the two Charters and those of the Titles X 
(Social Policy) and XI (European Social Fund) of the TFEU), read in synopsis, are very 
similar, however "convergent" (also because they are the result of "cultural 
contamination" stratified over time, albeit with uncertainties and rethinking, witnessed 
precisely by the reference to the "competitiveness" contained in section 2, and the 
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"declaration of faith" in the invisible hand of the market, contained in par. 3 of Article 
151 TFEU). 
 
 
5. The achievement of objectives and the modulation of protection paths 
 
The premise (due to a superficial approach) is that the difference (not really essential, in 
a general and abstract sense) between the two Charters is the "quality" of the formulas 
adopted; in the ESC, in fact, under the same paragraph dedicated to the same social law 
(eg: the right to social security, recognized under Article 12 ESC and Article 34 
CFREU) we find in the first Charter a systematic list (not mandatory) , but 
"parametric") of actions and measures, while in the corresponding formula of the 
second Charter we find a timid reference to the great general themes of the positive law 
of the Union on the subject, against the background of the most immediate fundamental 
freedoms enshrined in the TEU: freedom circulation in the physical space of the 
territory of the Union, to which the prohibition of discrimination on a national basis in 
access to the social security system in force in the "destination" country is functional.  
 
 
But there is more.  
 
The formula of paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the ESC is rich and inspired by a "dynamic" 
vision of the protection of social rights. 
The reference to the solemn undertaking signed by each member State “to endeavour to 
raise progressively the system of social security to a higher level “ it is not empty 
rhetorical formula. 
 
It is something measurable, in economic-monetary and statistical terms. 
 
The ECSR has shown to be aware of it, in the now well-tested technique of analysis and 
drafting of national reports (on the new perspectives of the role of the ECSR, see: 
STRAZIUSO (2012)). 
What has happened again in the last years is that the Committee, thanks to the 
experience and sensitivity gained during the periodic audit (whose only imperative is: 
“provide us with reliable and accurate data because it is our job to understand and 
suggest“, certainly not to impose upon the States Parties  percentages and "magic 
numbers" or “golden ratio” …), offered a "dynamic" reading (and therefore faithful to 
the founding rationale of the ESC) of these formulas. 
 
The linguistic expressions contained therein have been used as a paradigm useful for 
measuring the degree of achievement of the objectives set by the ESC. 
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Moreover (it should be noted strongly in today's reflections) paragraph 3 is inseparably 
linked to paragraph 2, whose formula constitutes the "closing" mechanism of the legal 
perimeter of the commitment assumed in the specific subject by the acceding Country 
(each State undertakes, indeed : “to maintain the social security system at a satisfactory 
level at least equal to that necessary for the ratification of the European Code of Social 
Security “. 
In fact (it should be noted even more in the context of "regressivity" of the protection of 
social rights in each Country included in the European legal area), this legal source 
(European Social Security Code - ECSS), drafted in 1964 after the birth of the ESC in 
the previous version of 1961,  is equipped with a Preamble with the following content:  
“The member States of the Council of Europe, signatory to this Code, Considering 
that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its 
members in order to promote, in particular, social progress;  
Considering that one of the objectives of the social program of the Council of Europe 
is to encourage all members to further develop their social security system;  
Recognizing the opportunity to harmonize the social security contributions of the 
member countries;  
Convinced of the advisability of creating a European Code of Social Security to a 
level higher than the minimum standards set out in the International Labour 
Convention n. 1023 (1952) concerning minimum standards of social security,  
They established the following provisions which have been developed in collaboration 
with the International Labour Office. “. 
 
In elementary terms: the formulas contained in the ECSS represent the an and the 
"indefectible" quomodo to be respected for entering the ”ESC club”; the formulas of the 
art. 12 ESC represent the tracks on which each State must be willing to be "measured" 
(also in the quantum ... of protection provided, according to the various legal 
institutions analyzed from time to time) by the ECSR, during its journey in view of the 
achievement of the objectives of the ESC; the choice to start and continue this journey 
was carried out in full freedom and sovereignty (with the seal of each national 
parliament in the ratification of the act of accession, if required …) but with full 
awareness of the solemnity of the commitments made in the European legal area. 
 
It should also be noted that the panel of Parties’ signatures of the ESC additional 
Protocol on collective complaints is narrower (13) than that of subscribers to the ECSS 
(20). 
 
From this gap there are undoubted negative consequences on the implementation path 
of the ESC. 
 
*** 
  
ISSN: 2174-6419                                                                                      Lex Social, vol. 8, núm. 1  (2018) 
 
252 
 
Returning to the legal scope of paragraph 3 of Article 12 ESC, in light of what has just 
been considered on the genesis of the ECSS, it should be noted, in fact, that the access 
point to the signing of the ESC Treaty is "modular" (menu, with some constraints, much 
lighter than the Fiscal compact and so on ...). 
 
And in fact, we read in the ESC :  
 
<< Part III - Article A - Undertakings 
 
 1. Subject to the provisions of Article B below, each of the Parties 
undertakes: 
 
  a. to consider Part I of this Charter as a declaration of the aims 
which it will pursue by all appropriate means, as stated in the introductory 
paragraph of that part; 
  b. to consider itself bound by at least six of the following nine 
articles of Part II of this Charter: Articles 1, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 16, 19 and 20; 
  c. to consider itself bound by an additional number of articles or 
numbered paragraphs of Part II of the Charter which it may select, provided that 
the total number of articles or numbered paragraphs by which it is bound is not 
less than sixteen articles or sixty-three numbered paragraphs. 
 
 2. The articles or paragraphs selected in accordance with sub 
paragraphs b and c of paragraph 1 of this article shall be notified to the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe at the time when the instrument of ratification, 
acceptance or approval is deposited. 
 
 3. Any Party may, at a later date, declare by notification addressed to 
the Secretary General that it considers itself bound by any articles or any 
numbered paragraphs of Part II of the Charter which it has not already accepted 
under the terms of paragraph 1 of this article. Such undertakings subsequently 
given shall be deemed to be an integral part of the ratification, acceptance or 
approval and shall have the same effect as from the first day of the month 
following the expiration of a period of one month after the date of the notification.  
 
 4. Each Party shall maintain a system of labour inspection appropriate 
to national conditions. >> 
 
°°° 
This particular genesis (quite innovative compared to the OIL_ILO paradigm, and it is 
significant that the genesis of the Code has actively participated in this international 
organization of "global" breath) is functionalized to the main objective: to give effect to 
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the commitments assumed by the Parties (States), given the character of "dynamic" 
participation in the "life of the club", with a single constraint: back (i.e. at a lower 
qualitative-quantitative level of protection of social rights, compared to the time of 
accession to the Treaty) we cannot return ... (see: Section III - Article A, paragraph 3). 
 
This is the semantic value of the expression "encourage" contained in the ECSS 
Preamble … 
 
Those who conceived the normative architecture (at a modular intersection, as in a 
shipyard ...) of the ESC (and in technical-legal function, of supporting specification, of 
the ECSS) were well aware of the gravity of the tasks required by the art. 12 ESC. 
 
For this a "filter" was created for the specific subscription of the Article (since it does 
not seem - on the theoretical level - to configure a menu subscription within article 12, 
but we cannot know the historical dynamics of adherence to the different drafting of the 
Treaty ESC over the years ...): it has the function of "encouraging" the choices of 
"conscious adherence" by the Parties (States). 
 
It is not surprising, at the outcome of the systematic analysis of the formulas contained 
in ESC, ECSS and CFREU, the different degree of specificity of the same. 
 
Those in CFREU represent a measure for the Community institutions (they do not seem 
frankly conceived neither for use by the Member States, nor for "direct" protection of 
individual subjective positions, in light of the clear ancillary nature of Title VII to the 
genesis and characteristics of “positive law” of the Union). 
 
Those in ESC constitute, instead, an "external limit" to the exercise of the power 
(legislative and / or administrative) of the Parties (States), by virtue of the solemn 
commitments made at the time of accession. 
 
There are well-known obstacles to an effective dialogue between ESC and EU law, not 
only and not so much at the level of Charters, but because the differences in the logic of 
orientation in the normative dynamics. 
 
The overcoming of these distances and the achievement of the maximum degree of 
convergence possible are in fact the objectives of the <<Turin Process>> pursued by the 
Council of Europe which the EU institutions seem to be now sensitive to (see:  BONET 
PEROT Silvia Eloisa, El Proceso deTurín: fortalecimiento de los derechos sociales en 
Europa,  Speech-paper at the international Conference "La Carta Social Europea. Pilar 
fundamental de las politicas sociales regionales in Europa”, organized in Valencia on  
November 16, 2017; and GUIGLIA (2017)). 
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Firstly, the "reserves" must be overcome in terms of substantive law: they can be read, 
limited to the EU member countries, with a view to "respect" national ("internal") 
constitutional traditions. For these countries the formulation of “reserves” of substantive 
(at constitutional level, often) law does not preclude, however, the verification of the 
degree of satisfaction of the envisaged requirement ("common" traditions), although 
still within the ("living") EU law (that is, the resulting from the application of EU 
sources in the judicial experience of the CJEU. 
Secondly, the (implicit) “reserves” on the procedural law level must also be overcome: 
this attitude is evidenced by the failure to sign the Protocol on collective complaints by 
Countries belonging to the ESC, which are also Members of the EU.  
 
It should be stressed that the same CFREU (Article 54) establishes a prohibition on 
regressivity; it is in fact not an empty “stilema”  the following expression: "Prohibition 
of the abuse of right - No provision of this Charter must be interpreted in the sense of 
entailing the right to exercise an activity or to perform an act that aims to destroy rights 
or liberties recognized in this Charter or to impose more extensive restrictions on these 
rights and freedoms than those set forth in this Charter. " 
It should also be noted that, in any case, the duty of collaboration to achieve the 
objectives indicated in the ESC, in the ECSS and in the CFREU obliges the 
Members/Parties States to respect the commitments solemnly assumed by them; this 
duty constitutes an unavoidable element of assessment by the National Judges in 
the resolution of the individual disputes to be examined in the matter of social 
rights, especially when they are focused on the respect of the principle of adequacy 
of social protection measures, and, from the point of subjective view, when the 
actor belongs to a group "at risk of social exclusion" (i.e. in substance, 
"marginalized"), often because of the regulatory contradictions and / or the 
administrative action of the State. 
 
With this we want to underline the circular nature of the process of focusing on legal 
cases whose (possible) "patrimonial" connotation is only of a phenomenological nature 
being functional to the realization of the specific measure of social protection. 
 
Borrowing a typical figure of classical Roman law, it can be said that a negative 
assessment made by the ECSR towards a State-Party of the ESC - both in the 
periodic national report and in the decision on one or more collective complaints - is 
fully suitable for establishing a reliable, serious, impartial and homogeneous legal 
basis (with a view to harmonizing the European legal area), almost as an edictum 
praetoris. This suggestion arose in our mind listening a speech-paper of Luis JIMENA 
QUESADA,  Il ruolo del Comitato Europeo dei Diritti Sociali nella definizione della 
dimensione sociale dell’Europa, May 9, 2014, Università di Verona – Scuola di 
Dottorato di Ricerca in Scienze giuridiche europee ed internazionali). 
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In the ancient Rome, the edictum praetoris was a particular form of programmatic edict 
as indicative of the activity of the praetor. 
In fact, the magistrate could apply both existing law and introduce new instruments of 
procedural protection, sometimes even in derogation from the ius civile, through the 
creation of a right "generated" by the process. 
It should be noted that the "praetorian law" thus formed was still anchored to current 
law (which was still the ius civile), in which however the various magistrates intervened 
adiuvandi, supplendi vel corrigendi iuris civilis gratia  ("with the grace to succurr, 
substitute or correct civil law"), or rather some of its gaps or inaccuracies. 
The purpose of the praetor was in fact to maintain the aequitas ("fairness"), or to 
guarantee equal conditions for citizens in the trial. 
The magistrates had the faculty of the ius dicere inter cives romanos ("to judge between 
Roman citizens"): they were in fact entitled to decide on private disputes within the city 
of Rome (Praetor urbanus) and not (Praetor peregrinus). 
The trial took place first in front of the judge who already decided the rule to be applied 
and then before an iudex unus (i.e. before a private individual with a single-judge 
function) that applied the rule. 
When, during the average Republic (III century BC), the magistrates introduced the 
formulation procedure into the proceedings, in which, to define the question concerning 
a case before the iudex, a set of rigid prescriptive formulas was used, the edictum 
praetoris became in practice a collection of formulas to be used in the proceedings. 
 
According to the Roman jurist Papiniano (Dig 1.1.7.1), the edictum was used to 
complete, explain, and improve the ius civile, becoming an important vehicle for the 
evolution of Roman civil law.  
From 67 BC, then, a lex Cornelia required the magistrate to respect his edict in the 
exercise of his functions. 
The edictum praetoris issued by the magistrate could be of two types: 
• perpetuum: Publicly published edict that was valid for the entire office of the 
magistrate; 
• repentinum: edict that was issued to make up for special occasions. 
 
More frequently, the edictum praetoris  took the form of perpetual edict: in it were 
defined the rules that would govern the administration of justice by the praetor during 
his (annual) office. Every time a new magistrate was elected, he issued his own 
perpetual edict in which he listed what actions the actor could ask, or, following the 
establishment of the formulation process, which formulas he protected from the actor 
and which situations he instead protected by the defendant (through the legal status of 
the exceptio); the edicts were issued publicly to make them known to the people. 
 
On the praetor's side there was the custom of reproducing part of the edict of his 
predecessor; so in every new perpetual edict there was always something of the 
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previous ones. Over time a nucleus was formed which was called edictum tralaticium 
("edict transmitted", almost inheritance) from a praetor to his successor, who would 
then integrate and renew it. 
 
*°* 
Reflecting in a transgenerational perspective, this is the task of the ECSR (enabled by 
the ESC to issue something different and more than responsa prudentium … being 
something different from the Consilium Principis …  ), in the alternation of reporting 
and decision-making activities on collective complaints. 
 
The expression of this incessant work (fruit of the meeting on a collective basis of 
independent personalities) should not remain vox clamans in the desert ... of European 
life 
 
Therefore, the National Judge (in particular the one operating in that country 
"concerned" by the evaluation of the Committee) can well justify his decision by 
referring to (similarly to what happened in the relations between praetor and iudex unus 
...) - as if it were an edictum tralaticium - to the "precedent" well highlighted, analyzed 
and "decided" or "reported" by the Committee. 
Such a reasoned motive could easily be subtracted from censures of a subsequent degree 
(of "merits") at national level, since it could not easily be argued against the ratio 
decidendi of the Committee itself. 
Moreover, it would be very easily confirmed in the scrutiny by the (possible) Judge of 
legitimacy (e.g. the Italian Court of Cassation or the Italian Constitutional Court to 
which the last question of interpretation could be submitted incidentally - or not - by a 
Judge of merits). 
 
Such a path of protection would be much more rapid and effective (i.e. virtuously 
inspired by the principle of effectiveness) of those traditionally known in the experience 
of the last decades (limited, of course, to EU member Countries): the signaling for 
activation of the procedure of infringement before the EU Commission (for violation of 
the "living law” of the EU, and therefore always in compliance with the Preamble and 
Title VII of the CFREU ...) or the proposition before the national judge for a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU (under Article 267 TFEU- former: Article 234  
TEC). 
 
In fact, we can read:  
" The Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction to give preliminary 
rulings: 
a) on the interpretation of the treaties; 
b) the validity and the interpretation of the acts carried out by the institutions, bodies or 
bodies of the Union. 
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When such a matter is raised before a jurisdiction of one of the Member States, such 
jurisdiction may, if it considers it necessary to issue its judgment a decision on this 
point, ask the Court to rule on the matter. 
When such a matter is raised in a judgment pending before a national jurisdiction, 
against whose decisions cannot propose a judicial review of domestic law, such 
jurisdiction is required to refer to the Court. 
When such a matter is raised in a judgment pending before a national jurisdiction 
concerning a person in custody, the Court shall act as quickly as possible. " 
 
It should be noted in this connection that the "remedy" of the proposition, before the 
National Court of last instance, of a request for a preliminary ruling ("necessary") to the 
CJEU will be increasingly implemented. 
It should also be noted that, in the Italian judicial experience, this "remedy" is poorly 
known and (consequently) little used. 
On closer inspection, this entails an undeniable advantage for the person who complains 
of the violation of a social right: from the lack of reference (i.e. from the unjustified 
reasoning of the refusal of the reference for a preliminary ruling) comes an objective 
responsibility of the Member State (to which administrative organization belongs the 
"insensitive" Judge ....). It follows an objective liability (of the State) which  is 
substantiated by a right of the protected subject to compensation for damages (also by 
the possibility of protection, nothing seems to exclude it ...), thanks to the proposition of 
a judicial action (in front of the functionally competent national judge (according to the 
general criteria of attribution of jurisdiction); this is by making analogical recourse to 
the provisions on the matter contained in an Italian law of "supranational" inspiration: 
(the s.c. "Pinto Law" of March 24, 2001, No. 89), not by chance issued to remedy a lack 
of social protection related to a protracted process over time. 
 
In fact, it must be remembered that, pursuant to art. 3 of the "Pinto Law" "the request 
for an equitable reparation is proposed by appeal to the president of the district court in 
which the competent court has its headquarters in accordance with article 11 of the 
code of criminal procedure to judge in proceedings concerning magistrates in whose 
district the proceeding in which the violation is assumed is concluded or terminated 
with respect to the degrees of merit. Article 125 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies. 
The appeal is brought against the Minister of Justice when it comes to proceedings of 
the ordinary judge ... ". 
 
In the Italian legal experience, it should be remembered that, pursuant to Law no. 117 of 
1988 (Compensation for damages caused in the exercise of judicial functions and civil 
responsibility of magistrates), the conditions for the compensation protection in this 
area were formulated as follows: 
 
“Art. 2.Responsibility for fraud or gross negligence 
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  1. Anyone who has suffered unjust damage as a result of conduct, of an act or of a 
judicial order instituted by the magistrate with malice or gross negligence in the 
exercise of his functions or for denial of justice may act against the State for obtain 
compensation for pecuniary damages and also for non-pecuniary damages deriving 
from deprivation of personal freedom. 
  2. In the exercise of judicial functions it cannot give rise to responsibility for the 
activity of interpretation of legal norms or the evaluation of facts and tests. 
  3. Constitute serious fault: 
    a) the serious violation of the law caused by inexcusable negligence; 
    b) the statement, determined by inexcusable negligence, of a fact whose existence is 
incontrovertibly excluded from the proceedings of the proceedings; 
    c) the negation, determined by inexcusable negligence, of a fact whose existence is 
incontrovertibly confirmed by the deeds of the proceeding; 
    d) the issue of provision concerning the liberty of the person outside the cases 
permitted by law or without motivation. 
 
Art. 3. Denial of justice 
1. The refusal, the omission or the delay of the magistrate in carrying out acts of his 
office is constituted refusal of justice when, after the expiry of the law for the fulfillment 
of the deed, the party has lodged an application to obtain the provision and have passed 
uselessly, without justified reason, thirty days from the date of filing at the registry. If 
the deadline is not foreseen, they must in any case run for thirty days from the date on 
which the request was filed with the request to obtain the provision. 
 
Art. 4.Competence and terms 
  1. The action for damages against the State must be exercised against the President of 
the Council of Ministers. Competent is the court of the district capital of the court of 
appeal to be determined in accordance with article - art. 11 c.p.p. " 
2. The action for compensation for damage to the State can be exercised only when the 
ordinary remedies or other remedies provided for by the precautionary and summary 
measures have been exhausted, and in any case when the modification or revocation of 
the provision or, if such remedies are not provided, when the degree of the proceedings 
in which the event that caused the damage occurred is exhausted. The application must 
be submitted under penalty of forfeiture within two years starting from the moment in 
which the action is available. 
3. The action may be exercised after three years from the date of the event which caused 
the damage if in this period the degree of the proceedings in which the event itself has 
not occurred has not been concluded. 
  4. In the cases provided for in Article 3, the action must be brought within two years of 
the expiry of the deadline by which the magistrate should have provided for the 
application. 
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  5. In no case does the term run against the party who, due to the confidentiality of the 
preliminary investigation, has not been aware of the fact. " 
 
*** 
In this way, the clear obsolescence of the Italian legal system in reference to the 
commitments assumed or requested in the supranational context is highlighted, in order 
to guarantee the principle of effectiveness of the provisions contained in the sources of 
protection of social rights, and this is the requirement fixed (having experienced all 
degrees of justice) is too burdensome, both because the objective limitation) exclusion 
of the error of law) is clearly elusive of the principle itself. 
This is all the more true since the CJEU criticized - in the context of the transposition of 
the infringement procedure for non-compliance with the previous judgment of 13 June 
2006, made by the Court in Case C-173 / 03 (Mediterranean Ferries) - the Italian 
Republic precisely because the Law n. 117/1988 excludes the existence of any 
"responsibility" of the Italian judge in case of "error of law" (including that deriving 
from or related to the lack of "familiarity" with EU law). 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union - Section III, with sentence of November 
24, 2011, n. 379, made in case C379/10, concerning the appeal for non-compliance, 
pursuant to art. 258 TFEU, proposed on 29 July 2010 by the European Commission, so 
decided against the Italian Republic: 
"1) The Italian Republic, excluding any responsibility of the Italian State for damages 
caused to individuals following a violation of EU law attributable to a national court 
of last instance, if such violation results from an interpretation of legal norms or from 
the evaluation of facts and tests carried out by the court itself, e 
limiting this responsibility only to cases of willful misconduct or gross negligence, 
pursuant to art. 2, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the law of April 13, 1988, n. 117, on the 
compensation for damages caused in the exercise of judicial functions and on the 
civil liability of magistrates, has failed in its obligations under the general principle of 
responsibility of the Member States for violation of EU law by one of the their own 
courts of last instance. 
2) The Italian Republic is ordered to pay the costs. " 
 
It is remarkable that in its appeal to the CJEU, the European Commission, in demanding 
the interpretation, also condemns the non-fulfillment of its obligations, by virtue of the 
general principle of the responsibility of the Member States for infringements of EU law 
by its own court of last resort degree. 
 
The CJEU had already amonished  at regard the Italian Republic in a previous decision 
(C 173/03, in particular: paragraphs 33 to 37). 
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The Italian legislator provided to reform the Law no. 117/1988 (by Law no. 18/2015) ; 
in fact : 
 “Art. 2. Responsibility for fraud or gross negligence 
  1. Anyone who has suffered unjust damage as a result of conduct, of an act or of a 
judicial order instituted by the magistrate with malice or gross negligence in the 
exercise of his functions or for denial of justice may act against the State for obtain 
compensation for patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages 
 2. Without prejudice to paragraphs 3 and 3-bis and cases of willful misconduct, in the 
exercise of judicial functions cannot give rise to the responsibility for the 
interpretation of rules of law or the assessment of facts and evidence. 
 3. The manifest infringement of the law as well as the law of the European Union is a 
serious offense (…)”. 
 
In this paper it is sufficient to pointing out that in the Italian legal system the 
ESC(revised 1996) is (also in a formal sense) a law of the Italian Republic (ratification 
Law no.  30/1999.) 
 
*°* 
Returning to the profile of the preliminary ruling to be asked to the CJEU, it should be 
recalled that the EU Commission itself recently issued a special formal act (such as to 
constitute "living law of the Union") in this area. 
 
The Recommendations to the attention of national judges, concerning the 
presentation of references for preliminary rulings (2012 / C 338/1) of 6 November 
2012 (with immediate entry into force since its publication on the same date in the 
GUUE), it is hardly applicable to a case in which the social right violated is not ruled by 
a “derivated” form of EU law (e.g. Directives, Regulations); in fact the degree of 
inference between a standard of protection governed by the ESC and its “twin” 
established by EU law could be very high, even if it is not obvious that the two 
disciplines go in the same direction.  
 
In case of doubt it is not obvious that the most effective way is the preliminary reference 
to the CJEU (or the activation of an infringement procedure before the EU 
Commission). 
 
In my opinion the ECSR preserves a holistic approach to the submitted questions ; 
while the CJEU behavior is more focused to the safeguard of the fundamental freedoms 
of EU. 
 
Quid juris ?  and  … above all : quis judex ? 
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In order not to remain “prisoners of the present case” we must always imagine new and 
different circular and modular protection routes. 
We will have the undoubted advantage of not finding on our way the usual procedural 
obstacles, often abused by the national legislator to "discourage" the person (and his/her 
family) - made weaker by the loss of work - to start the “path of protection” towards the 
place ubi jus audire. 
 
It is important to underline that these "paths of protection" are not antithetical and can 
be crossed simultaneously: the request to a Court of merit for a cross-reference to the 
National Constitutional Court, or the request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU (both 
discussing the trial before a court of merit or before a national court of last resort); the 
activation of a infringement procedure for violation of the EU living law (including, of 
course, the CFREU and, through it, with the well-known limits, the ESC itself); the 
activation of a collective claim through an NGO in front of the ECSR (also a 
documented non-compliance report that can be used in the preparation of the national 
periodic report).  
They are all useful tools to be modeled to offer the marginalized subjects the best 
possible social protection to make Europe better, that Europe that is made by all of us 
who do not want to stop breathing its air of freedom and peace. 
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TEXT OF THE  
REMISSION ORDER TO THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
THE COURT OF ROME 
III Labour Division  
In the person of the designated judge, dr. Maria Giulia Cosentino 
in the case 
 between 
F.S. (Lawyer Carlo de Marchis Gomez) 
Appellant  
And  
S.S. SRL, in the person of the legal pro tempore representative  
defendant contumacious 
dissolving the reserve taken at the hearing on 10 June 2017, has  pronounced the 
following 
ORDER 
1.Facts of the case, the illegitimacy of the dismissal and its consequences 
The appellant challenged her dismissal imposed on  December 15
th
  2015, a few months 
after she had been formally employed on May 11
th
, 2015; the dismissal was based on 
this  motivation: “following growing economic-productive problems that do not allow 
us the regular continuation of the employment relationship, Your work can no longer be 
profitable for  the company. Having noticed that it is not possible, within the company, 
to find another job position in order to  place You , we are forced to dismiss You for 
justified objective reasons pursuant to art. 3 of the law n. 604 of 15 July 1966 ". 
In the declared default of the defendant company, it is to be noted that this has not 
fulfilled the charge of proving the validity of the adduced motivation, moreover 
extremely generic and  adaptable to any situation, thence unsuitable to fulfill the 
purpose for which the motivational charge is intended (see Cass. Labour Division n. 
7136/2002); nor has the defendant contested the employment dimensions indicated by 
the applicant and therefore the protection applicable by law to the worker in this case. 
This protection is established by the articles 3-4 of the Legislative Decree n. 23/2015, 
result of the proxy contained in the law n n. 183/2014, and in particular: 
Article. 3 provides: "1. Except as provided in paragraph 2, in cases in which  it is 
established that the details of the dismissal do not occur for justified objective reason or 
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for justified subjective reason or just cause, the judge declares the employment 
relationship terminated on the date of dismissal and condemns the employer to pay an 
indemnity not subject to social security contributions for an amount equal to two 
months of the final reference salary for the calculation of the termination indemnity for 
each year of service, in any case not less than four and not more than twenty-four 
monthly salary "; 
 
Article 4 provides: "1. In the case in which the dismissal is ordered with violation of the 
motivation requirement referred to in Article 2, paragraph 2 of law no. 604 of 1966 or 
of the procedure referred to in Article 7 of Law no. 300 of 1970, the judge declares the 
employment relationship extinguished on the date of dismissal and condemns the 
employer to the payment of an indemnity not subject to social security contribution of 
an amount equal to one month salary of the last reference salary for the calculation of 
the termination indemnity treatment for each year of service, in any case not less than 
two and not more than twelve month salaries, unless the judge, on the basis of the 
worker's request, ascertains the existence of the conditions for the application of the 
protections referred to in Articles 2 and 3 of this decree ". 
In the event that the employer does not reach a certain level of employment, then, the 
measure of the indemnity is halved pursuant to Article 9: “Where the employer does not 
meet the dimensional requirements referred to in Article 18, paragraph 8
th
  and 9
th
   of 
Law no. 300 of 1970, article 3, paragraph 2 shall not apply, and the amount of 
compensation and of the amount provided for in article 3, paragraph 1, by article 4, 
paragraph 1 and article 6, paragraph 1is halved and can not in any case exceed the 
limit of six month salaries”.  
Furthermore, the applicant implicitly attached that the defendant had the dimensional 
requirements set out in Article 18 of the law n. 300/1970, when she invoked the 
protection referred to in Article 3 of Legislative Decree 23/2015 and also the subsequent 
Article 9, and in documents there are no indicative elements of a lower level of 
employment. 
All this is because the appellant was hired after 7 March 2015: as that  for the employed 
up to that date, the protection against the unlawful dismissal is constituted by the Article 
18 of the Law 300/1970, as amended by Law 92/2012, which provides for the two 
corresponding hypotheses: 
Paragraph 7: for the case of absence of objective reason (defined as  lack of 
justification, manifested inexistence of the fact on which the dismissal is based), that  
recalls paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 depending on the severity of the defect: “The judge 
applies the same discipline referred to in the fourth paragraph of this article in the 
hypothesis in which he ascertains the defect of justification of the dismissal ordered, 
also pursuant to articles 4, paragraph 4, and 10, paragraph 3, of the law 12 March 
1999, n. 68, for objective reason consisting in the physical or mental inability of the 
worker, or that the dismissal was ordered in violation of article 2110, second 
paragraph, of the civil code”. 
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He can also apply the aforesaid discipline in the hypothesis in which he  ascertains the 
evident non-existence of the fact on which dismissal is based  for justified objective 
motive; in the other hypothesis in which he  ascertains that the details of the 
aforementioned justified reason are not met, the judge applies the discipline referred to 
in the fifth paragraph. In the latter case, the judge, for the purposes of determining the 
indemnity between the minimum and maximum required , he  considers, in addition to 
the criteria referred to in the fifth paragraph, the initiatives taken by the worker for the 
search for a new employment and the behavior of the parties within the procedure 
referred to in Article 7 of the law of 15 July 1966, n. 604, and subsequent modifications. 
If, in the course of the judgment, on the basis of the application formulated by the 
worker, the dismissal is determined by discriminatory or disciplinary reasons, the 
relative protections provided for in this article are applied: 
- in turn the fourth paragraph quoad poenam provides that: “annuls the dismissal 
and condemns the employer to reintegration in the workplace referred to in the 
first subparagraph and to the payment of a compensatory allowance 
commensurate with the last overall pay from the day of the dismissal until that 
of the actual reintegration , deducted what the worker has received, during the 
period of exclusion, for the performance of other work activities, as well as the 
amount the worker would have  perceived dedicating himself diligently to the 
search for a new occupation. In any case, the compensatory allowance measure 
may not exceed twelve month salaries  of total de facto remuneration. The 
employer is also sentenced to the payment of social security contributions from 
the day of the dismissal until the effective reintegration , plus the interest in the 
legal measure without the application of penalties for failure or delayed 
contribution, for an amount equal to the contribution differential existing 
between the contribution that would have accrued in the employment 
relationship resolved by the illegitimate dismissal and the one credited to the 
worker as a result of the performance of other work activities "; 
- and the fifth paragraph quoad poenam provides that: ” declares terminated the 
employment relationship with effect from the date of dismissal and orders the 
employer to pay an all-inclusive compensatory allowance  determined between a 
minimum of twelve and a maximum of twenty-four month salaries of the last pay 
(Editor’s note: global monthly pay de facto), in relation to seniority of the 
worker and taking into account the number of employees employed, the size of 
the economic activity, the behavior and conditions of the parties, with a specific 
motivation in this regard”; 
- paragraph 6 for the case of lack of motivation (of dismissal): “in the hypothesis 
in which the dismissal is declared ineffective for violation of the motivation 
requirement referred to in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the law of 15 July 1966, n. 
604, and subsequent modifications, of the procedure referred to in Article 7 of 
the present law, or of the procedure referred to in Article 7 of the Law of 15 July 
1966, n. 604, and subsequent modifications, the regime referred to in the fifth 
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paragraph applies, but with the attribution to the worker of a determined all-
inclusive compensatory allowance , in relation to the seriousness of the formal 
or procedural violation committed by the employer, between a minimum of six 
and a maximum of twelve monthly payments of the final remuneration , with the 
charge of specific motivation in this regard, unless the judge, on the basis of the 
worker's request, ascertains that there is also a justifying defect of  the 
dismissal, in which case he applies, instead of those provided for in this 
paragraph, the protections referred to in the fourth, fifth or seventh paragraphs 
". 
This judge considers that, given the extreme generality of the alleged motivation 
and the absolute lack of proof of the validity of some of the circumstances 
laconically mentioned in the expulsion, the recognizable defect is the most 
serious among those indicated, namely the " non recurrence of the extremes of 
dismissal for justified objective reason " (in the language of the legislator of 
2015), or the " manifest inexistence of the fact on which the dismissal for 
justified objective reason is based ". 
In short, if employed before 7 March 2015, the appellant would have enjoyed 
reinstatement protection and an indemnity commensurate  with 12 months' 
salary (having passed  more than 12 months between expulsion and the first 
court hearing), or applying paragraph 5 of the art. 18, of the only indemnity 
protection between 12 and 24 months; while, having been employed after that 
date, she is  only entitled to 4 month salaries, and only because the defendant's 
default allows you to presume presumptively proved the dimensional 
requirement , otherwise the  compensation monthly salaries would have been 2. 
Even if a mere defect of the motivation was found, the protection in the vigor of 
the art. 18 would have been much more substantial (6-12 months of 
compensation compared to 2). 
2. The suspicion of unconstitutionality and the parameters of  judgment 
This judge believes that it is not to be doubted the relevance of the issue  of the 
constitutionality of Article 1, paragraph 7, letter c) Law no. 183/2014 and of the Articles 
2, 4 and 10 of Legislative Decree no. 23/2015: the legislative innovation in question 
deprives today's appellant of most of the protections still in force for those who have 
been hired indefinitely before March 7, 2015. The legislation precludes any judging 
discretion of the judge, previously exercisable even if anchored to the criteria set forth 
in Article 8 of the Law no. 604/1966 and Article 18 of the Statute (Editor’s note: Law 
no. 300/1970) as amended by Law no. 92/2012, imposing to the same an automatism on 
the basis of which the worker is entitled, in case of ascertained illegitimacy of the 
withdrawal (Editor’s note: dismissal), the small amount of compensation provided. 
 The non-manifesting groundlessness of the issue fully  emerges  from the following 
considerations, focused on the considered contrast of the legislation with: 
A) Article 3 of the Constitution, as the amount of compensation indemnity drawn by the 
provisions of the so called "Jobs Act" is neither compensatory nor dissuasive and has 
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discriminatory consequences; and furthermore, inasmuch as the total elimination of the 
judge's discretionary judgment ends up regulating in a uniform way very dissimilar 
cases; 
B) Articles 4 and 35 of the Constitution, as regards the right to work, founding value of 
the Charter (Editor’s note: the Italian Constitution) , is given a derisive and fixed 
monetary counter-value; 
C) Art. 117 and the art. 76 of the Constitution, since the sanction for illegitimate 
dismissal seems inadequate compared to what is established by supranational sources 
such as the Nice Charter and the Social Charter, while respect for community regulation 
and supranational conventions was a precise proxy criterion, which is was therefore 
violated. 
It should be noted that the contrast with the Constitution, does not occur because of the 
elimination of the reintegration protection - if not for the null and  discriminatory 
dismissals,  and for specific cases of disciplinary dismissal (Article 1, paragraph 7, letter 
c of the law delegation) and therefore because of the full monetization of the guarantee 
offered to the worker: indeed the Constitutional Court has already repeatedly ruled that 
reintegrating protection is not the only possible paradigm for the implementation of the 
constitutional precepts referred to  Articles. 4 and 35 (see paragraphs 46/2000, No. 
303/2011). 
The suspicion of unconstitutionality is here formulated, instead, by reason of the 
concrete discipline of compensatory allowance which, in compensating only for the 
equivalent of the unjust damage suffered by the worker, is today also destined to take 
the place of the concurrent compensation in a specific form constituted from 
reinstatement (which has become a protection for a few cases of exceptional gravity) 
and therefore should have been much more substantial and adequate. 
The Constitutional Court has indeed stated on several occasions, most recently in the 
aforementioned order no. 303/2011, that "the general rule of completeness of the 
reparation and equivalence of the same to the damage caused to the injured person has 
no constitutional cover" (judgment No. 148 of 1999), provided that the adequacy of the 
compensation is guaranteed (judgments No. 199 of 2005 and No. 420 of 1991): and this 
is precisely the specific profile with respect to which the legislation in question does not 
escape the doubt of constitutionality. 
 
2.A. Contrast with Article 3 Const. 
The prevision of an allowance  modest , fixed and increasing  only on the basis of 
length  of service does not constitute adequate relief for workers hired after March 7, 
2015 and unfairly dismissed and it violates the principle of equality. In other words, the 
regression of protection for how unreasonable and disproportionate violates the Article 
3 of the Constitution, differentiating between old and new hired workers, therefore does 
not satisfy the test of the balancing of the opposing interests at stake imposed by the 
judgment of reasonableness. 
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In fact, we reflect on the following symptomatic circumstances of  lack of compensatory 
character of the indemnity: 
- the employment of the applicant allowed the employer to benefit from a 36-month 
contribution relief provided for by Law no. 190/2014 of a much higher amount than the 
conviction that will be received here: in fact, the legislator encourages, with these 
measures, opportunistic behavior and social dumping; while the applicant in return for a 
few months of work and a modest compensation will have  much more difficulty in 
finding a new occupation as she  will no longer carry with her the "dowry" of the relief. 
- the fixed compensation measure does not allow the judge to assess in practice the 
suffered prejudice, neither with regard to the free riding phenomenon of the defendant 
described above, nor with regard to the seriousness of the defect (the motivation, though 
present, is tautological and generic at most) nor with regard to the duration of the 
process, arriving to order identical protection in  situations very dissimilar in substance; 
as we will recall, the existence of evaluation margins referring to the criteria set out in 
Article 8 of the Law no. 604/1966, significantly  constituted  foundation, of the rejection 
ruling of the issue of constitutionality of the Article 32 of the Law no. 183/2010 with 
reference to Article 3 of the Constitution (ruling No. 303/2011). 
These circumstances are also symptomatic of the lack of deterrent character of the 
sanction, since, as we have said, the illegitimate dismissal ordered after a few months of 
work assisted by the use of the contribution relief constitutes a "bargain" for the 
employer who incentives, instead of deterring, free-riding behavior without risk, since, 
in fact, the indemnity that the employer will have to pay to the outcome of the trial is 
fixed, predetermined and regardless of the gravity of illegitimacy, so a "pseudo-
motivation" like the into examination (we can paraphrase it as: "I dismiss you because 
there are conditions to fire you") equals, quoad poenam,  any other reason found in the 
facts as unfounded.  
It is known, incidentally, that the  legitimacy judge considers outdated the already 
dominant orientation, which excluded the sanctioning nature (other than compensatory-
restorative) of the civil liability and considers  this aspect fully compatible with the 
general principles of our legal system (see Cass. S.U. n. 9100/2015): lastly the United 
Sections on 5 July 2017 (sent No. 16601), in declaring compatibility, on the occurrence 
of certain conditions, of the institute of US origin of the so called "Punitive reparations" 
have established that "In the current legal system, to  civil responsibility is not assigned 
only the task of restoring the patrimonial sphere of the person who suffered the injury, 
since the deterrent function and the sanctioning of the civil liability are internal": 
offering an overview of compensatory hypotheses with effects also dissuasive of recent 
institution in which appears also the Article 18, paragraph 2 of the Law no. 300/1970, 
where it provides, for cases of unlawful dismissal subject to reinstatement protection, 
also a minimum amount equal to five month salaries  of the total remuneration as 
compensatory allowance paid by the employer; 
as well as the flat-rate indemnity for the illegitimacy of the stipulation of the term 
applied to the employment contract as per Article 32 of the Law no. 183/2010 that the 
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aforementioned ruling of the Constitutional Court n. 303/2011 has assessed immune 
from defects of constitutionality (as well as the possibility of an evaluative discretion on 
the quantum, as mentioned) also on the basis of its "clear sanctioning value", 
highlighted by the elimination of the possibility to subtract the aliunde perceptum. 
Therefore, if it is not only a compensation but also a sanction, the adequacy judgment 
prevails because a ridiculous quantification, as in this  case,  results in an incentive for 
non-fulfillment, rather than its opposite. 
In other words, the scrutinized discipline  does not induce companies to adopt virtuous 
conducts, where it codifies that an act contrary to the law and of  non-fulfillment of the 
commitment to stability assumed with the stipulation of the permanent employment 
contract ( only case encouraged on the contributory side) is subject to an indemnity 
penalty of a limited amount, severed from the actual injury caused, subtracted, in its 
quantification, to the assessment of the judge, who continues to assess the conditions, 
and even lower than the related contributory benefit. 
It is no coincidence that the first analysis of the evolution of the labor market after the 
entry into force of the "Jobs Act" ( Law No. 183/2014 and related implementing 
decrees) clearly indicates that, with the weakening of the effects of the advantage 
contribution (at the expense of the community), the employment push that was intended 
to be  incentivized with these rules has also been exhausted and that today it is again 
entrusted in effect to the cases that the legislative delegation intended to make less 
convenient for companies, namely to  temporary employment relationships and to work 
through agencies ( see ISTAT report on I quarter 2017, in acts). 
The consequences of a system thus designed, differentiating in a totally unreasonable 
way similar situations, are (and this will be  proved over time) discriminating to the 
detriment of new employees regardless of the quality of their performance: given that in 
the same organization otherwise  protected employees - who stipulated an identical 
employment contract - will co-exist;  it is clear that, in case of necessity to reduce staff, 
the company will always favor the least expensive and problematic expulsion of 
workers under the "Jobs Act" regime. 
In fact, if it is true,  in principle, that " does not in itself contrast with the principle of 
equality a different treatment applied to the same cases, but at different moments in 
time, since the flow of time can constitute a valid  diversification element  of legal 
situations, (..), being a consequence of the general principles in terms of succession of 
laws over time "( see Constitutional Court, ruling  No. 254/2014,  on the possible 
conflict with Article 3 of the Constitution, from the point of view of the unequal 
treatment, of the new regime of jointly liability applicable to contracts), it is true that the 
date of employment appears as an accidental and extrinsic datum to each relationship 
which is not suitable for differentiating one relationship from another, being  all other 
substantial profile  equal. 
And then, the same theorists of labor law and economics that inspired the reform of the 
"Jobs Act", in supporting (in the opinion of this judge) that the protection against the 
unlawful dismissal does not necessarily have to be of reinstatement content, but can be 
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(and in their opinion it would be more appropriate that it was) constituted by an 
indemnity of predictable size for the employer who intends to dismiss (so-called firing 
cost), they did not fail to point out that the degree of protection offered - and therefore 
the 'extent of the insurance content' of the employment relationship - depends 
essentially on the cost of the dismissal, which corresponds to the threshold below which 
the loss expected from the continuation of the relationship is part of the risk by the 
company. Along the same lines,  the XI Labor Commission of the Parliament that in the 
session of 17 February 2015 approved the draft legislative decree that later became n. 
23/2015, but on  condition that the Government would revise the measures, "considered 
that,  for the unjustified dismissals to which the conservative sanction does not apply, it 
is necessary to increase the minimum measure and the maximum measure of the 
economic indemnity due to the worker" : invitation completely disregarded by the 
Government. 
In the intention of the theoreticians who inspired the legislation under consideration and 
in the first version of the delegation, in fact, the contract "with increasing protections", 
just to make it compatible with the principle of equality and real disincentive to 
precariousness, should have facilitated stable integration in the labor market through a 
mitigation of protection against dismissals of merely temporary nature, and therefore 
without prejudice to the application of ordinary protection according  to the former 
Article 18 at the end of a first (albeit long) phase of the relationship; the protections of 
Legislative Decree no. 23/2015, on the other hand, are not "increasing" at all, since with 
the passing  of time they do not increase  guarantees but only the indemnity in 
proportion to the seniority of the worker, who can no longer permanently access the 
standard protections of the workers hired before March 7, 2015; and that, on the 
contrary, it meets a maximum indemnity limit after twelve years of service. 
The unreasonable treatment disparity emerges, finally, smoothly from the 
comparison: 
- not only among workers hired before and after March 7, 2015, even in the same 
company; 
- and not only among workers dismissed with measures affected by macroscopic 
illegitimacy or by merely formal defects, all unreasonably protected, today, with 
an indemnity of the same amount; 
- but also, for what regards the workers hired after March 7, 2015, between 
managers and workers without the managerial qualification, since the former, 
not subject to the new regulations, will continue to receive indemnities of a  
minimum and maximum amount far more substantial.   
2.B. Contrast with   Articles 4 and 35 Const. 
Article 4 of the Constitution ("the Republic recognizes all citizens the right to work and 
promotes the conditions that make this right effective") and art. 35, paragraph 1 ("the 
Republic protects work in all its forms and applications") cannot be said to have been 
enforced in a legislation such as the one under consideration, which basically "assesses" 
the right to work, as an instrument for the realization of the person and a means of 
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social and economic emancipation, with a quantification that is so modest and 
evanescent, in comparison with the legislation ex lege 92/2012 still in force, and 
moreover it is fixed and growing according to the parameter of mere seniority; almost a 
factual reinstatement of the absolute freedom of dismissal (whose opposition to the 
Constitution is expressly stated in judgement No. 36/2000 of the Constitutional Court) 
that cancels the "constraint " effect deriving from the existence of mandatory 
authorizations (just cause and justified reason). 
Moreover, the protections of dismissals  have a relevance that goes far beyond the 
specific affair of the withdrawal and the protection of the stability of income and 
employment, since they support the contractual strength of the worker in the daily 
relationship at the workplace. What's more: effective protection against a hypothetically 
unjustified dismissal - a right that is not by chance  explicitly stated internationally, as 
it will be better said - protects the fundamental freedoms of workers  in their workplace: 
freedom of expression and dissent , the defense of dignity when this is threatened by 
superiors or colleagues, the defense and claim of their rights, the possibility of 
activating trade union if desired, etc. 
The "Jobs Act" system and in particular, as far as we are concerned, the quantification 
of the indemnity in question is, on the contrary, built on a conscious rupture of the 
principle of equality and solidarity in the workplace which cannot explain its own 
effects also on the other rights of constitutionally protected workers (trade union 
freedom, freedom of expression, etc.). 
2.C. Contrast with  Articles 76 and 117 Const. 
The adoption of adequate and necessary measures to guarantee the right to work is 
a specific aim of the social policy of the State that the republic must pursue also 
through the stipulation of international agreements and participation in 
international organizations (article 35, paragraph 3 of the Constitution ). 
In compliance with the provisions of art. 117 of the Constitution, the Republic accepts, 
in the exercise of its sovereign legislative power, the constraints deriving from 
Community law and international treaties which therefore assume the character of 
interposed norms that are nevertheless suitable to represent a parameter of 
constitutionality of domestic law (see Const. Court  rulings No. 348 and No. 349 of 
2007). 
Article. 76 of the Constitution, moreover,  states that " the exercise of the legislative 
function cannot be delegated to the Government except with the determination of 
guiding principles and criteria and only for a limited time and for defined objects ", 
with the consequence that also the  respect of these  principles and criteria can be 
discussed in the constitutional legitimacy of legislative decrees. 
With reference to the dismissal for justified reason, in particular, paragraph 7 of the 
Article 1 of the Law no. 183/2014 indicates as a general criterion the "coherence with 
the regulation of the European Union and the international conventions". 
In the light of the above considerations, the legislation in question does not appear to 
be in conformity: 
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- with art. 30 of the Nice Charter (that requires Member States to ensure adequate 
protection in the event of unjustified dismissal); 
- with ILO Convention n. 158/1982 on dismissals, which states  that, if the dismissal 
is unjustified, if the judge or bodies competent   to judge the deed of withdrawal 
"do not have the power to cancel the dismissal and / or to order or propose the 
reinstatement of the worker, or do not believe that this is possible in the given situation, 
must be authorized to order the payment of an appropriate indemnity or any other form 
of repair considered to be appropriate "; 
- with art. 24 of the European Social Charter, which states: "to ensure the effective 
exercise of the right to protection in the event of dismissal, the Parties commit 
themselves to  recognize: a) the right of workers not to be dismissed without a valid 
reason related to the their attitudes or their conduct or based on the needs of the 
company’s operation, of the plant  or the service; b) the right of dismissed workers 
without a valid reason, to a suitable indemnity or other adequate reparation ". 
The congruety and adequacy of compensation  guaranteed  to the workers and 
therefore the respect of the principles set  by this last source has been the subject of 
several rulings by the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), which, while 
acknowledging that the measure may not be of restoring nature  but a mere indemnity, 
has ruled that the compensation must be adequate (from the worker's point of view) and 
dissuasive (from the point of view of the employer) and therefore, in essence, it 
constitutes supranational confirmation of what so far  has been said. 
With two separate decisions of January 31, 2017, complaints n. 106/2014 and n. 
107/2014 both against Finland, the ECSR, interpreted Article 24 of the European Social 
Charter following a collective appeal promoted by the Finnish Society of Social Rights, 
which had complained about  the violation of Article 24 of the Charter in relation to the 
Finnish national provisions which provided, on the one hand, the conditions for 
ordering a dismissal for a justified objective reason and, on the other hand, the 
employer's responsibility in case of illegitimate withdrawal. 
The ECSR has specified that, according to the Charter, adequate compensation or 
other appropriate remedy must be granted  to the employees dismissed without 
justified reason;  and that adequate compensation is considered the one that 
includes: 
      – the reimbursement of the economic losses incurred between the date of dismissal 
and the decision of the appeal; 
      – the possibility of reintegration; 
– “compensation at a level high enough to dissuade the employer and compensate 
the damage suffered by the employee”. 
It follows that, in principle, any compensation limit that precludes a 
"compensation" commensurate with the suffered loss and sufficiently dissuasive 
is contrary to the Charter. 
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In the present case, the Finnish legislation provided for a limit of 24 monthly 
pays as the maximum limit for compensation for the damage from unlawful 
dismissal. 
In this context, the Committee notes that the maximum limit of compensation 
provided by the law can lead to situations in which the awarded compensation is 
not commensurate with the suffered loss : it follows that the plafonnement of 
compensation complements a violation of Article 24 of the Charter. 
Also in the 2016 conclusions (Editor's note: ECSR's 2014 National Report) 
relating to the Italian legislation in force in 2014 (and therefore to Law No. 
92/2012), the Committee recalled that any limit that could determine to the 
recognized allowances  not to be in relationship with the suffered prejudice 
and sufficiently dissuasive is forbidden. 
It is true that the Social Charter lacks a Court with powers similar to those 
which, in defense of human rights, are attributed to the Court of Strasbourg,  that 
is a Court able to exercise a real jurisdiction: only collective complaints are 
provided, governed by the Additional Protocol of the Charter, ie a restricted 
procedure aimed at monitoring the obligations signed  by the States upon 
ratification and acceptance of the European Social Charter; procedure that gives 
rise to a report to the Committee of Ministers in which it is established that  "if 
the Contracting Party in question has or has not done satisfactorily to the 
implementation of the rule of the Card object of the complaint", following which 
the Committee of Ministers, in turn, can adopt a resolution (by a two-thirds 
majority of voters) containing a recommendation to the Contracting Party in 
question, if the European Committee of Social Rights has detected "an 
unsatisfactory implementation of the Charter" (Article 9 of the Additional 
Protocol). 
Nonetheless, the Social Charter must be considered, like the ECHR, as an 
interposed source (and in this sense, see Constitutional Court, ruling No. 
178/2015); in any case, as mentioned above, the alleged violation of 
supranational principles is to support the assessment of the contrast of the 
legislation under examination with the articles. 3, 4 and 35 of the Constitution 
from the point of view of the justification of the unequal treatment of workers 
seeking employment and workers already employed in March 2015 and of 
violation of the commitment to promote international agreements and 
organizations aimed at establishing and regulating the rights work (third 
paragraph of Article 35). 
The acceptance of the proposed question of constitutionality would allow, in this 
case, to recognize to the applicant a compensatory protection for the actual 
prejudice suffered, that  would then be constituted by the protection referred to 
in Article 18, paragraphs 4 and 7 (in the alternative, paragraph 5) of the Law no. 
300/1970 as amended by Law no. 92/2012; and to remedy (broadly  sanctionary 
other than compensatory) to the behavior of today's defendant who evidently 
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intended to profit the contributory benefit by hiring a worker whom then got rid 
of  with a pseudo-motivated  dismissal. 
 
The interpretative option of conformity consisting in widening the sphere of 
application of full reintegration protection with reference to the "other cases of 
nullity foreseen by the law", overcoming that orientation (at national level still 
majoritarian) that requires demonstration by the worker of the unlawful reason 
determining the conduct of the employer (Article 1345 of the Civil Code) 
appears an interpretative forcing (permitted only if the Constitutional Court 
referred to, should indicate such a way with an interpretative ruling of rejection 
of  the question): in essence this option would result in a equalization  between 
retaliatory dismissal, that is in fraud with the law, and (seriously, but only) 
unjustified dismissal. 
In absence of reply in the conclusions of the appeal, it also appears, in this case, 
to oppose the principle that the petendi causa of the action proposed by the 
worker to contest the validity and effectiveness of the dismissal must be 
identified in the specific ground of illegality of the act deduced in the 
introductory application (see Cassation Court Labour Section, ruling No. 
7687/2017), for which the declaration of nullity of the dismissal as retaliatory  
appears to be flawed, even on the basis of emerging circumstances from the acts, 
when the appellant has only deduced the absence of just cause (see Cassation 
Court  Labour Section, ruling  No. 19142/2015) 
Lastly, this judge does not recognize itself  the power, in the context of a compliant  
interpretation, to determine, on the basis of its personal conviction, the adequate 
sanction in the event of an unlawful dismissal, or even the power to apply a  rule to the 
concrete case different than the one  provided by the legislator (in hypothesis applying 
Article 18 Law No. 300/1970, instead of Article 3 of Legislative Decree No. 23/2015), 
since the conforming interpretation cannot be resolved, as it is known, in an abrogative 
effect. 
In conclusion, and in sight of the above considerations, this judge considers that he 
must assume  relevant and not manifestly unfounded  the issue  of constitutional 
legitimacy of the rules indicated in the device in relation to the profiles mentioned  
above.  
The trial  in progress must therefore be suspended and the acts  returned to the 
Constitutional Court. 
P.Q.M.  
(Editor's note: for the following reasons) 
seen the Article 23 paragraph 2 of the Law  March 11, 1953 n. 87  declares relevant and 
not manifestly unfounded he question of constitutional legitimacy of the Article 1 , 
paragraph 7, letter c)  of the Law No. 183/2014 and of the Articles 2, 4 and 10 of the 
Legislative Decree No. 23/2015, by contrast with the Articles 3, 4, 76 and 117, 
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paragraph 1, of the Constitution, read independently and also in correlation between 
them. 
The present trial is suspended. 
Sends to the chancellery to notify this order to the President of the Council of Ministers 
and to communicate it to the Presidents of the two Houses of Parliament. 
It has the transmission of the order and of the proceedings of the judgment to the 
Constitutional Court together with the proof of the prescribed communications. 
Dispone la trasmissione dell’ordinanza e degli atti del giudizio alla Corte 
Costituzionale unitamente alla prova delle comunicazioni prescritte. 
Notify the applicant 
Si comunichi alla ricorrente. 
Rome, July 26th, 2017. 
Judge  Maria Giulia Cosentino 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
